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NONPARAMETRIC ANALYSIS OF RANDOM UTILITY MODELS
YUICHI KITAMURA∗ AND JO¨RG STOYE∗∗
Abstract. This paper develops and implements a nonparametric test of Random Utility Models. The
motivating application is to test the null hypothesis that a sample of cross-sectional demand distribu-
tions was generated by a population of rational consumers. We test a necessary and sufficient condition
for this that does not restrict unobserved heterogeneity or the number of goods. We also propose and
implement a control function approach to account for endogenous expenditure. An econometric result
of independent interest is a test for linear inequality constraints when these are represented as the
vertices of a polyhedral cone rather than its faces. An empirical application to the U.K. Household
Expenditure Survey illustrates computational feasibility of the method in demand problems with 5
goods.
1. Introduction
This paper develops new tools for the nonparametric analysis of Random Utility Models (RUM).
We test the null hypothesis that a repeated cross-section of demand data might have been generated
by a population of rational consumers, without restricting either unobserved heterogeneity or the
number of goods. Equivalently, we empirically test McFadden and Richter’s (1991) Axiom of Revealed
Stochastic Preference. To do so, we develop a new statistical test that promises to be useful well
beyond the motivating application.
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2 KITAMURA AND STOYE
We start from first principles and end with an empirical application. Core contributions made
along the way are as follows.
First, the testing problem appears formidable: A structural parameterization of the null hy-
pothesis would involve an essentially unrestricted distribution over all nonsatiated utility functions.
However, the problem can, without loss of information, be rewritten as one in which the univer-
sal choice set is finite. Intuitively, this is because a RUM only restricts the population proportions
with which preferences between different budgets are directly revealed. The corresponding sample
information can be preserved in an appropriate discretization of consumption space.
More specifically, observable choice proportions must be in the convex hull of a finite (but long)
list of vectors. Intuitively, these vectors characterize rationalizable nonstochastic choice types, and
observable choice proportions are a mixture over them that corresponds to the population distribution
of types. This builds on McFadden (2005) but with an innovation that is crucial for testing: While
the set just described is a finite polytope, the null hypothesis can be written as a cone. Furthermore,
computing the list of vectors is hard, but we provide algorithms to do so efficiently.
Next, the statistical problem is to test whether an estimated vector of choice proportions is
inside a nonstochastic, finite polyhedral cone. This is reminiscient of multiple linear inequality testing
and shares with it the difficulty that inference must take account of many nuisance parameters.
However, in our setting, inequalities are characterized only implicitly through the vertices of their
intersection cone. It is not computationally possible to make this characterization explicit. We provide
a novel test and prove that it controls size uniformly over a reasonable class of d.g.p.’s without
either computing facets of the cone or resorting to globally conservative approximation. This is a
contribution of independent interest that has already seen other applications (Deb, Kitamura, Quah,
and Stoye 2018, Hubner 2018, Lazzati, Quah, and Shirai 2018a, Lazzati, Quah, and Shirai 2018b).
Also, while our approach can become computationally costly in high dimensions, it avoids a statistical
curse of dimensionality (i.e., rates of approximation do not deteriorate), and our empirical exercise
shows that it is practically applicable to at least five-dimensional commodity spaces.
Finally, we leverage recent results on control functions (Imbens and Newey (2009); see also
Blundell and Powell (2003)) to deal with endogeneity for unobserved heterogeneity of unrestricted
dimension. These contributions are illustrated on the U.K. Family Expenditure Survey, one of the work
horse data sets of the literature. In that data, estimated demand distributions are not stochastically
rationalizable, but the rejection is not statistically significant.
3The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related litera-
ture. Section 3 lays out the model, develops a geometric characterization of its empirical content,
and presents algorithms that allow one to compute this characterization in practice. All of this hap-
pens at population level, i.e. all identifiable quantities are known. Section 4 explains our test and
its implementation under the assumption that one has an estimator of demand distributions and
an approximation of its sampling distribution. Section 5 explains how to get the estimator, and a
bootstrap approximation to its distribution, by both smoothing over expenditure and adjusting for
endogenous expenditure. Section 6 contains a Monte Carlo investigation of the test’s finite sample
performance, and Section 7 contains our empirical application. Section 8 concludes. Supplemental
materials collect all proofs (Appendix A), pseudocode for some algorithms (Appendix B), and some
algebraic elaborations (Appendix C).
2. Related Literature
Our framework for testing Random Utility Models is built from scratch in the sense that it
only presupposes classic results on nonstochastic revealed preference, notably the characterization
of individual level rationalizability through the Weak (Samuelson 1938), Strong (Houthakker 1950),
or Generalized (Afriat 1967) Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP, SARP, and GARP henceforth).
At the population level, stochastic rationalizability was analyzed in classic work by McFadden and
Richter (1991) updated by McFadden (2005). This work was an important inspiration for ours, and
we will further clarify the relation later, but they did not consider statistical testing nor attempt to
make the test operational, and could not have done so with computational constraints even of 2005.
An influential related research project is embodied in a sequence of papers by Blundell, Brown-
ing, and Crawford (2003, 2007, 2008; BBC henceforth), where the 2003 paper focuses on testing
rationality and bounding welfare and later papers focus on bounding counterfactual demand. BBC
assume the same observables as we do and apply their method to the same data, but they analyze a
nonstochastic demand system generated by nonparametric estimation of Engel curves. This could be
loosely characterized as revealed preference analysis of a representative consumer and in practice of av-
erage demand. Lewbel (2001) gives conditions on a RUM that ensure integrability of average demand,
so BBC effectively add those assumptions to ours. Also, the nonparametric estimation step in practice
constrains the dimension of commodity space, which equals three in their empirical applications.1
1BBC’s implementation exploits only WARP and therefore a necessary but not sufficient condition for rationalizability.
This is remedied in Blundell, Browning, Cherchye, Crawford, De Rock, and Vermeulen (2015).
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Manski (2007) analyzes stochastic choice from subsets of an abstract, finite choice universe.
He states the testing and extrapolation problems in the abstract, solves them explicitly in simple
examples, and outlines an approach to non-asymptotic inference. (He also considers models with
more structure.) While we start from a continuous problem and build a (uniform) asymptotic theory,
the settings become similar after our initial discretization step. However, methods in Manski (2007)
will only be practical for choice universes with a handful of elements, an order of magnitude less
than in Section 7 below. In a related paper, Manski (2014) uses our computational toolkit for choice
extrapolation.
Our setting much simplifies if there are only two goods, an interesting but obviously very specific
case. Blundell, Kristensen, and Matzkin (2014) bound counterfactual demand in this setting through
bounding quantile demands. They justify this through an invertibility assumption. Hoderlein and
Stoye (2015) show that with two goods, this assumption has no observational implications.2 Hence,
Blundell, Kristensen, and Matzkin (2014) use the same assumptions as we do; however, the restriction
to two goods is fundamental. Blundell, Kristensen, and Matzkin (2017) conceptually extend this
approach to many goods, in which case invertibility is a restriction. A nonparametric estimation step
again limits the dimensionality of commodity space. They apply the method to similar data and the
same goods as BBC, meaning that their nonparametric estimation problem is two-dimensional.
Hausman and Newey (2016) nonparametrically bound average welfare under assumptions re-
sembling ours, though their approach additionally imposes smoothness restrictions to facilitate non-
parametric estimation and interpolation. Their main identification results apply to an arbitrary num-
ber of goods, but the approach is based on nonparametric smoothing, hence the curse of dimensionality
needs to be addressed. The empirical application is to two goods.
With more than two goods, pairwise testing of a stochastic analog of WARP amounts to testing
a necessary but not sufficient condition for stochastic rationalizability. This is explored by Hoderlein
and Stoye (2014) in a setting that is otherwise ours and also on the same data. Kawaguchi (2017) tests
a logically intermediate condition, again on the same data. A different test of necessary conditions was
proposed by Hoderlein (2011), who shows that certain features of rationalizable individual demand,
like adding up and standard properties of the Slutsky matrix, are inherited by average demand under
weak conditions. The resulting test is passed by the same data that we use. Dette, Hoderlein, and
Neumeyer (2016) propose a similar test using quantiles.
2A similar point is made, and exploited, by Hausman and Newey (2016).
5Section 4 of this paper is (implicitly) about testing multiple inequalities, the subject of a large
literature in economics and statistics. See, in particular, Gourieroux, Holly, and Monfort (1982) and
Wolak (1991) and also Chernoff (1954), Kudo (1963), Perlman (1969), Shapiro (1988), and Takemura
and Kuriki (1997) as well as Andrews (1991), Bugni, Canay, and Shi (2015), and Guggenberger, Hahn,
and Kim (2008). For the also related setting of inference on parameters defined by moment inequalities,
see furthermore Andrews and Soares (2010), Bugni (2010), Canay (2010), Chernozhukov, Hong, and
Tamer (2007), Imbens and Manski (2004), Romano and Shaikh (2010), Rosen (2008), and Stoye
(2009). The major difference to these literatures is that moment inequalities, if linear (which most of
the papers do not assume), define a polyhedron through its faces, while the restrictions generated by
our model correspond to its vertices. One cannot in practice switch between these representations in
high dimensions, so that we have to develop a new approach. This problem also occurs in a related
problem in psychology, namely testing if binary choice probabilities are in the so-called Linear Order
Polytope. Here, the problem of computing explicit moment inequalities is researched but unresolved
(e.g., see Doignon and Rexhep (2016) and references therein), and we believe that our test is of
interest for that literature. Finally, Hoderlein and Stoye (2014) only compare two budgets at a time,
and Kawaguchi (2017) tests necessary conditions that are directly expressed as moment inequalities.
Therefore, inference in both papers is much closer to the aforecited literature.
3. Analysis of Population Level Problem
We now show how to verify rationalizability of a known set of cross-sectional demand dis-
tributions on J budgets. The main results are a tractable geometric characterization of stochastic
rationalizability and algorithms for its practical implementation.
3.1. Setting up the Model. Throughout this paper, we assume the existence of J < ∞ fixed
budgets Bj characterized by price vectors pj ∈ RK+ and expenditure levels Wj > 0. Normalizing
Wj = 1 for now, we can write these budgets as
Bj = {y ∈ RK+ : p′jy = 1}, j = 1, ..., J.
We also start by assuming that the corresponding cross-sectional distributions of demand are known.
Thus, assume that demand in budget Bj is described by the random variable y(pj), then we know
(3.1) Pj(x) := Pr(y(pj) ∈ x), x ⊂ RK+
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for j = 1, ..., J .3 We will henceforth call (P1, ..., PJ) a stochastic demand system.
The question is if this system is rationalizable by a RUM. To define the latter, let
u : RK+ 7→ R
denote a utility function over consumption vectors y ∈ RK+ . Consider for a moment an individual
consumer endowed with some fixed u, then her choice from a budget characterized by normalized
price vector p would be
(3.2) y ∈ arg max
y∈RK+ :p′y≤1
u(y),
with arbitrary tie-breaking if the solution is not unique. For simplicity, we restrict utility functions
by monotonicity (“more is better”) so that choice is on budget planes, but this is not conceptually
necessary.
The RUM postulates that
u ∼ Pu,
i.e. u is not constant but is distributed according to a constant (in j) probability law Pu. In our
motivating application, Pu describes the distribution of preferences in a population of consumers, but
other interpretations are conceivable. For each j, the random variable y(pj) then is the distribution
of y defined in (3.2) that is induced by pj and Pu. Formally:
Definition 3.1. The stochastic demand system (P1, ..., PJ) is (stochastically) rationalizable if there
exists a distribution Pu over utility functions u so that
(3.3) Pj(x) =
∫
1{arg max
y∈RK+ :p′jy=1
u(y) ∈ x}dPu, x ⊂ Bj , j = 1, ..., J.
This model is completely parameterized by Pu, but it only partially identifies Pu because many
distinct Pu will induce the same stochastic demand system. We do not place substantive restrictions
on Pu, thus we allow for minimally constrained, infinite dimensional unobserved heterogeneity across
consumers.
Definition 3.1 reflects some simplifications that we will drop later. First, Wj and pj are non-
random, which is the framework of McFadden and Richter (1991) and others but may not be realistic
in applications. In the econometric analysis in Section 5 as well as in our empirical analysis in Section
7, we treat Wj as a random variable that may furthermore covary with u. Also, we initially assume
3To keep the presentation simple, here and henceforth we are informal about probability spaces and measurability.
See McFadden (2005) for a formally rigorous setup.
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Figure 1. Visualization of Example 3.1.
that Pu is the same across price regimes. Once Wj (hence pj , after income normalization) is a random
variable, this is essentially the same as imposing Wj⊥ u, an assumption we maintain in Section 4 but
drop in Section 5 and in our empirical application. However, for all of these extensions, our strategy
will be to effectively reduce them to (3.3), so testing this model is at the heart of our contribution.
3.2. A Geometric Characterization. The model embodied in (3.3) is extremely general; again, a
parameterization would involve an essentially unrestricted distribution over utility functions. However,
we next develop a simple geometric characterization of the model’s empirical content and hence of
stochastic rationalizability.
To get an intuition, consider the simplest example in which (3.3) can be tested:
Example 3.1. There are two intersecting budgets, thus J = 2 and there exists y ∈ RK++ with
p′1y = p′2y.
Consider Figure 1, whose labels will become clear. (The restriction to R2 is only for the figure.)
It is well known that in this example, individual choice behavior is rationalizable unless choice from
each budget is below the other budget, in which case a consumer would revealed prefer each budget
to the other one. Does this restrict repeated cross-section choice probabilities? Yes: Supposing for
simplicity that there is no probability mass on the intersection of budget planes, it is easy to see (e.g.
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by applying Fre´chet-Hoeffding bounds) that the cross-sectional probabilities of the two line segments
labeled (pi1|1, pi1|2) must not sum to more than 1. This condition is also sufficient (Matzkin 2006).
Things rapidly get complicated as budgets are added, but the basic insight scales. The only
relevant information for testing (3.3) is what fractions of consumers revealed prefer budget j to k
for different (j, k). This information is contained in the cross-sectional choice probabilities of the line
segments highlighted in Figure 1 (plus, for noncontinuous demand, the intersection). The picture
will be much more involved in interesting applications – see Figure 2 for an example – but the idea
remains the same. This insight allows one to replace the universal choice set RK+ with a finite set and
stochastic demand systems with lists of corresponding choice probabilities. But then there are only
finitely many rationalizable nonstochastic cross-budget choice patterns. A rationalizable stochastic
demand system must be a mixture over them and therefore lie inside a certain finite polytope.
Formalizing this insight requires some notation.
Definition 3.2. Let X := {x1, ..., xI} be the coarsest partition of ∪Jj=1Bj such that for any i ∈
{1, ..., I} and j ∈ {1, ..., J}, xi is either completely on, completely strictly above, or completely strictly
below budget plane Bj . Equivalently, any y1, y2 ∈ ∪Jj=1Bj are in the same element of the partition iff
sg(p′jy1 − 1) = sg(p′jy2 − 1) for all j = 1, ..., J .
Elements of X will be called patches. Patches that are part of more than one budget plane
will be called intersection patches. Each budget can be uniquely expressed as union of patches; the
number of patches that jointly comprise budget Bj will be called Ij . Note that
∑J
j=1 Ij ≥ I, strictly
so (because of multiple counting of intersection patches) if any two budget planes intersect.
Remark 3.1. Ij ≤ I ≤ 3J , hence Ij and I are finite.
The partition X is the finite universal choice set alluded to earlier. The basic idea is that all
choices from a given budget that are on the same patch induce the same directly revealed preferences,
so are equivalent for the purpose of our test. Conversely, stochastic rationalizability does not at all
constrain the distribution of demand on any patch. Therefore, rationalizability of (P1, . . . , PJ) can be
decided by only considering the cross-sectional probabilities of patches on the respective budgets. We
formalize this as follows.
Definition 3.3. The vector representation of (B1, ...,BJ) is a
(∑J
j=1 Ij
)
-vector
(x1|1, . . . , xI1|1, x1|2, . . . , xIJ |J),
9where (x1|j , . . . , xIj |j) lists all patches comprising Bj . The ordering of patches on budgets is arbitrary
but henceforth fixed. Note that intersection patches appear once for each budget containing them.
Definition 3.4. The vector representation of (P1, ..., PJ) is the
(∑J
j=1 Ij
)
-vector
pi := (pi1|1, . . . , piI1|1, pi1|2, . . . , piIJ |J),
where pii|j := Pj(xi|j).
Thus, the vector representation of a stochastic demand system lists the probability masses that
it assigns to patches.
Example 3.1 continued. This example has a total of 5 patches, namely the 4 line segments
identified in the figure and the intersection. The vector representations of (B1,B2) and (P1, P2) have
6 components because the intersection patch is counted twice. If one disregards intersection patches
(as we will do later), the vector representation of (P1, P2) is (pi1|1, pi2|1, pi1|2, pi2|2); see Figure 1.
Next, a stochastic demand system is rationalizable iff it is a mixture of rationalizable non-
stochastic demand systems. To intuit this, one may literally think of the latter as characterizing
rational individuals. It follows that the vector representation of a rationalizable stochastic demand
system must be the corresponding mixture of vector representations of rationalizable nonstochastic
demand systems. Thus, define:
Definition 3.5. The rational demand matrix A is the (unique, up to ordering of columns) matrix
such that the vector representation of each rationalizable nonstochastic demand system is exactly one
column of A. The number of columns of A is denoted H.
Remark 3.2. H ≤∏Jj=1 Ij , hence H is finite.
We then have:
Theorem 3.1. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) The stochastic demand system (P1, ..., PJ) is rationalizable.
(ii) Its vector representation pi fulfills pi = Aν for some ν ∈ ∆H−1, the unit simplex in RH .
(iii) Its vector representation pi fulfills pi = Aν for some ν ≥ 0.
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Theorem 3.1 reduces the problem of testing (3.3) to testing a null hypothesis about finite
(though possible rather long) vector of probabilities. Furthermore, this hypothesis can be expressed
as finite cone, a simple but novel observation that will be crucial for testing.4
We conclude this subsection with a few remarks.
Simplification if demand is continuous. Intersection patches are of lower dimension than
budget planes. Thus, if the distribution of demand is continuous, their probabilities must be zero,
and they can be eliminated from X . This may considerably simplify A. Also, each remaining patch
belongs to exactly one budget plane, so that
∑J
j=1 Ij = I. We impose this simplification henceforth
and in our empirical application, but none of our results depend on it.
GARP vs SARP. Rationalizability of nonstochastic demand systems can be defined using
either GARP or SARP. SARP will define a smaller matrix A, but nothing else changes. However,
columns that are consistent with GARP but not SARP must select at least three intersection patches,
so that GARP and SARP define the same A if X was simplified to reflect continuous demand.
Generality. At its heart, Theorem 3.1 only uses that choice from finitely many budgets reveals
finitely many distinct revealed preference relations. Thus, it applies to any setting with finitely many
budgets, irrespective of budgets’ shapes. For example, the result was applied to kinked budget sets in
Manski (2014) and could be used to characterize rationalizable choice proportions over binary menus,
i.e. the Linear Order Polytope. The result furthermore applies to the “random utility” extension of
any other revealed preference characterization that allows for discretization of choice space; see Deb,
Kitamura, Quah, and Stoye (2018) for an example.
3.3. Examples. We next illustrate with a few examples. For simplicity, we presume continuous
demand and therefore disregard intersection patches.
Example 3.1 continued. Dropping the intersection patch, we have I = 4 patches. Index
vector representations as in Figure 1, then the only excluded behavior is (1, 0, 1, 0)′, thus
A =

1 0 0
0 1 1
0 1 0
1 0 1

x1|1
x2|1
x1|2
x2|2
.
4The idea of patches, as well as equivalence of (i) and (ii) in Theorem 3.1, were anticipated by McFadden (2005).
While the explanation of patches is arguably unclear and (i)⇔(ii) is not explicitly pointed out, the idea is unquestionably
there. The observation that (ii)⇔(iii) (more importantly: the idea of using this for testing) is new.
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The column cone of A can be explicitly written as {(ν1, ν2 + ν3, ν2, ν1 + ν3)′ : ν1, ν2, ν3 ≥ 0}. As
expected, the only restriction on pi beyond adding-up constraints is that pi1|1 + pi1|2 ≤ 1.
Example 3.2. The following is the simplest example in which WARP does not imply SARP, so that
applying Example 3.1 to all pairs of budgets will only test a necessary condition. More subtly, it
can be shown that the conditions in Kawaguchi (2017) are only necessary as well. Let K = J = 3
and assume a maximal pattern of intersection of budgets; for example, prices could be (p1, p2, p3) =
((1/2, 1/4, 1/4), (1/4, 1/2, 1/4), (1/4, 1/4, 1/2)). Each budget has 4 patches for a total of I = 12
patches, and one can compute
A =

0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

x1|1
x2|1
x3|1
x4|1
x1|2
x2|2
x3|2
x4|2
x1|3
x2|3
x3|3
x4|3
.
Interpreting A requires knowing the geometry of patches. Given the ordering of patches used
in the above, choice of x3|1, x2|2, and x3|3 from their respective budgets would reveal a preference
cycle, thus A does not contain the column (0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0)′. We revisit this example in our
Monte Carlo study.
Example 3.3. Our empirical application has sequences of J = 7 budgets in RK for K = 3, 4, 5 and
sequences of J = 8 budgets in R3. Figure 2 visualizes one of the budgets in R3 and its intersection
with 6 other budgets. There are total of 10 patches (plus 15 intersection patches). The largest A-
matrices in the application are of sizes 78× 336467 and 79× 313440. In exploratory work using more
complex examples, we also computed a matrix with over 2 million columns.
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Figure 2. Visualization of one budget set in the empirical application.
3.4. Computing A. It should be clear now (and we formally show below) that the size of A, hence
the cost of computing it, may escalate rapidly as examples get more complicated. We next elaborate
how to compute A from a vector of prices (p1, ..., pJ). For ease of exposition, we drop intersection
patches (thus SARP=GARP) and add remarks on generalization along the way. We split the problem
into two subproblems, namely checking whether a binary “candidate” vector a is in fact a column of
A and finding all such vectors.
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3.4.1. Checking rationalizability of a. Consider any binary I-vector a with one entry of 1 on each
subvector corresponding to one budget. This vector corresponds to a nonstochastic demand system.
It is a column of A if this demand system respects SARP, in which case we call a rationalizable.
To check such rationalizability, we initially extract a direct revealed preference relation over
budgets. Specifically, if (an element of) xi|j is chosen from budget Bj , then all budgets that are above
xi|j are direct revealed preferred to Bj . This information can be extracted extremely quickly.5
We next exploit a well-known representation: Preference relations over J budgets can be iden-
tified with directed graphs on J labeled nodes by equating a directed link from node i to node j with
revealed preference for Bi over Bj . A preference relation fulfills SARP iff this graph is acyclic. This
can be tested in quadratic time (in J) through a depth-first or breadth-first search. Alternatively, the
Floyd-Warshall algorithm (Floyd 1962) is theoretically slower but also computes rapidly in our appli-
cation. Importantly, increasing K does not directly increase the size of graphs checked in this step,
though it allows for more intricate patterns of overlap between budgets and, therefore, potentially for
richer revealed preference relations.
If intersection patches are retained, then one must distinguish between weak and strict revealed
preference, and the above procedure tests SARP as opposed to GARP. To test GARP, one could use
Floyd-Warshall or a recent algorithm that achieves quadatic time (Talla Nobibon, Smeulders, and
Spieksma 2015).
3.4.2. Collecting rationalizable vectors. A total of
∏J
j=1 IJ vectors a could in principle be checked
for rationalizability. Doing this by brute force rapidly becomes infeasible, including in our empirical
application. However, these vectors can be usefully identified with the leaves (i.e. the terminal nodes)
of a tree constructed as follows: (i) The root of the tree has no label and has I1 children labelled
(x1|1, . . . , xI1|1). (ii) Each child in turn has I2 children labelled (x1|2, . . . , xI2|2), and so on for a total
of J generations beyond the root. Then there is a one-to-one mapping from leaves of the tree to
conceivable vectors a, namely by identifying every leaf with the nonstochastic demand system that
selects its ancestors. Furthermore, each non-terminal node of the tree can be identified with an
incomplete a-vector that specifies choice only on the first j < J budgets. The methods from Section
3.4.1 can be used to check rationalizability of such incomplete vectors as well.
5In practice, we compute a (I × J)-matrix X where, for example, the i-th row of X is (0,−1, 1, 1, 1) if xi|1 is on
budget B1, below budget B2, and above the remaining budgets. This allows to vectorize construction of direct revealed
preference relations, including strict vs. weak revealed preference, though we do not use the distinction.
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Our suggested algorithm for computing A is a depth-first search of this tree. Importantly,
rationalizability of the implied (possibly incomplete) vector a is checked at each node that is visited.
If this check fails, the node and all its descendants are abandoned. A column of A is discovered
whenever a terminal node has been reached without detecting a choice cycle. Pseudocode for the tree
search algorithm is displayed in Appendix B.
3.4.3. Remarks on computational complexity. The cost of computing A will escalate rapidly under
any approach, but some meaningful comparison is possible. To do so, we consider three sequences,
all indexed by J , whose first terms are displayed in Table 1. First, any two distinct nonstochastic
demand systems induce distinct direct revealed preference relations; hence, H is bounded above by
H¯J , the number of distinct directed acyclic graphs on J labeled nodes. This sequence – and hence the
worst-case cost of enumerating the columns of A, not to mention computing them – is well understood
(Robinson 1973), increases exponentially in J , and is displayed in the first row of Table 1.
Next, a worst-case bound on the number of terminal nodes of the aforementioned tree, hence
on vectors that a brute force algorithm would check, is 2J(J−1). This is simply because the number
of conceivable candidate vectors a equals
∏J
j=1 Ij , and every Ij is bounded above by 2
J−1. The
corresponding sequence is displayed in the last row of Table 1.
Finally, some tedious combinatorial book-keeping (see Appendix C) reveals that the depth-first
search algorithm visits at most
∑J
j=2 H¯j−12
j(J+2−j)−2 nodes. This sequence is displayed in the middle
row of the table, and the gain over a brute force approach is clear.6
It is easy to show that the ratio of any two sequences in the table grows exponentially. Also,
all of the bounds are in principle attainable (though restricting K may improve them) and are indeed
attained in Examples 3.1 and 3.2. In our empirical application, the bounds are far from binding (see
Tables 4 and 5 for relevant values of H), but brute force was not always feasible, and the tree search
improved on it by orders of magnitude in some cases where it was.
3.4.4. Further Refinement. A modest amount of problem-specific adjustment may lead to further
improvement. The key to this is contained in the following result.
Theorem 3.2. Suppose that not all budget planes mutually intersect; in particular, there exists M < J
s.t. BJ is either above all or below all of (B1, ...,BM ). Suppose also that choices from (B1, ...,BJ−1) are
rationalizable. Then choices from (B1, ...,BJ) are rationalizable iff choices from (BM+1, ...,BJ) are.
6The comparison favors brute force because some nodes visited by a tree search are non-terminal, in which case
rationalizability is easier to check. For example, this holds for 16 of the 64 nodes a tree search visits in Example 3.2.
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J 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
H¯J 1 3 25 543 29281 3.78× 106 1.14× 109 7.84× 1011
tree search 1 4 64 2048 167936 3.49× 107 1.76× 1010 2.08× 1013
brute force 1 4 64 4096 1048576 1.08× 108 4.40× 1012 7.21× 1016
Table 1. Worst-case bounds on the number of rationalizable vectors a and on the
number of candidate vectors visited by different algorithms.
If the geometry of budgets allows it – this is particularly likely if budgets move outward over
time and even guaranteed if some budget planes are parallel – Theorem 3.2 can be used to construct
columns of A recursively from columns of A-matrices that correspond to a smaller J . The gain can be
tremendous because, at least with regard to worst-case cost, one effectively moves one or more columns
to the left in Table 1. A caveat is that application of Theorem 3.2 may require to manually reorder
budgets so that it applies. Also, while the internal ordering of (B1, . . . ,BM ) and (BM+1, . . . ,BJ−1)
does not matter, the theorem may apply to distinct partitions of the same set of budgets. In that
case, any choice of partition will accelerate computations, but we have no general advice on which is
best. We tried the refinement in our empirical application, and it considerably improved computation
time for some of the largest matrices. However, the tree search proved so fast that, in order to keep
it transparent, our replication code omits this step.
4. Statistical Testing
This section lays out our statistical testing procedure in the idealized situation where, for finite
J , repeated cross-sectional observations of demand over J periods are available to the econometrician.
Formally, for each 1 ≤ j ≤ J , suppose one observes Nj random draws of y distributed according to
Pj defined in (3.1). Define N =
∑J
j=1Nj for later use. Clearly, Pj can be estimated consistently
as Nj ↑ ∞ for each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ J . The question is whether the estimated distributions may, up to
sampling uncertainty, have arisen from a RUM. We define a test statistic and critical value and show
that the resulting test is uniformly asymptotically valid over an interesting range of d.g.p.’s.
4.1. Null Hypothesis and Test Statistic. By Theorem 3.1, we wish to test:
(HA): There exist ν ≥ 0 such that Aν = pi.
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This hypothesis is equivalent to
(HB): minη∈C [pi − η]′Ω[pi − η] = 0,
where Ω is a positive definite matrix (restricted to be diagonal in our inference procedure) and C :=
{Aν|ν ≥ 0} is a convex cone in RI . The solution η0 of (HB) is the projection of pi ∈ RI+ onto C under
the weighted norm ‖x‖Ω =
√
x′Ωx. The corresponding value of the objective function is the squared
length of the projection residual vector. The projection η0 is unique, but the corresponding ν is not.
Stochastic rationality holds if and only if the length of the residual vector is zero.
A natural sample counterpart of the objective function in (HB) would be minη∈C [pˆi−η]′Ω[pˆi−η],
where pˆi estimates pi, for example by sample choice frequencies. The usual scaling yields
JN := N min
η∈C
[pˆi − η]′Ω[pˆi − η](4.1)
= N min
ν∈RH+
[pˆi −Aν]′Ω[pˆi −Aν].
Once again, ν is not unique at the optimum, but η = Aν is. Call its optimal value ηˆ. Then ηˆ = pˆi,
and JN = 0, if the estimated choice probabilities pˆi are stochastically rationalizable; obviously, our
null hypothesis will be accepted in this case.
4.2. Simulating a Critical Value. We next explain how to get a valid critical value for JN under
the assumption that pˆi estimates the probabilities of patches by corresponding sample frequencies and
that one has R bootstrap replications pˆi∗(r), r = 1, ..., R. Thus, pˆi∗(r)− pˆi is a natural bootstrap analog
of pˆi − pi. We will make enough assumption to ensure that its distribution consistently estimates the
distribution of pˆi − pi0, where pi0 is the true value of pi. The main difficulty is that one cannot use pˆi
as bootstrap analog of pi0.
Our bootstrap procedure relies on a tuning parameter τN chosen s.t. τN ↓ 0 and
√
NτN ↑ ∞.7
Also, we restrict Ω to be diagonal and positive definite and let 1H be a H-vector of ones
8. The
7In this section’s simplified setting and if pˆi collects sample frequencies, a reasonable choice would be
τN =
√
logN
N
where N = minj Nj and Nj is the number of observations on Budget Bj : see (4.8). This choice corresponds to the “BIC
choice” in Andrews and Soares (2010). We will later propose a different τN based on how pi is in fact estimated.
8In principle, 1H could be any strictly positive H-vector, though a data based choice of such a vector is beyond the
scope of the paper.
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restriction on Ω is important: Together with a geometric feature of the column vectors of the matrix
A, it ensures that constraints which are fulfilled but with small slack become binding through the
Cone Tightening algorithm we are about to describe. A non-diagonal weighting matrix can disrupt
this property. For further details on this point and its proof, the reader is referred to Appendix A.
Our procedure is as follows:
(i) Obtain the τN -tightened restricted estimator ηˆτn , which solves
min
η∈CτN
N [pˆi − η]′Ω[pˆi − η] = min
[ν−τN1H/H]∈RH+
N [pˆi −Aν]′Ω[pˆi −Aν].
(ii) Define the τN -tightened recentered bootstrap estimators
pˆi∗(r)τN := pˆi
∗(r) − pˆi + ηˆτN , r = 1, ..., R.
(iii) The bootstrap test statistic is
J ∗(r)N = min
[ν−τN1H/H]∈RH+
N [pˆi∗(r)τN −Aν]′Ω[pˆi∗(r)τN −Aν],
for r = 1, ..., R.
(iv) Use the empirical distribution of J ∗(r)N , r = 1, ..., R to obtain the critical value for JN .
The object ηˆτN is the true value of pi in the bootstrap population, i.e. it is the bootstrap analog
of pi0. It differs from pˆi through a “double recentering.” To disentangle the two recenterings, suppose
first that τN = 0. Then inspection of step (i) of the algorithm shows that pˆi would be projected onto
the cone C. This is a relatively standard recentering “onto the null” that resembles recentering of the
J-statistic in overidentified GMM. However, with τN > 0, there is a second recentering because the
cone C itself has been tightened. We next discuss why this recentering is needed.
4.3. Discussion. Our testing problem is related to the large literature on inequality testing but adds
an important twist. Writing {a1, a2, ..., aH} for the column vectors of A, one has
C = cone(A) := {ν1a1 + ...+ νHaH : νh ≥ 0},
i.e. the set C is a finitely generated cone. The following result, known as the Weyl-Minkowski
Theorem, provides an alternative representation that is useful for theoretical developments of our
statistical testing procedure.9
9See Gruber (2007), Gru¨nbaum, Kaibel, Klee, and Ziegler (2003), and Ziegler (1995), especially Theorem 1.3, for
these results and other materials concerning convex polytopes used in this paper.
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Theorem 4.1. (Weyl-Minkowski Theorem for Cones) A subset C of RI is a finitely generated cone
(4.2) C = {ν1a1 + ...+ νHaH : νh ≥ 0} for some A = [a1, ..., aH ] ∈ RI×H
if and only if it is a finite intersection of closed half spaces
(4.3) C = {t ∈ RI |Bt ≤ 0} for some B ∈ Rm×I .
The expressions in (4.2) and (4.3) are called a V-representation (as in “vertices”) and a H-representation
(as in “half spaces”) of C, respectively.
The “only if” part of the theorem (which is Weyl’s Theorem) shows that our rationality
hypothesis pi ∈ C, C = {Aν|ν ≥ 0} in terms of a V-representation can be re-formulated in an H-
representation using an appropriate matrix B, at least in theory. If such B were available, our testing
problem would resemble tests of
H0 : Bθ ≥ 0 B ∈ Rp×q is known
based on a quadratic form of the empirical discrepancy between Bθ and η minimized over η ∈ Rq+.
This type of problem has been studied extensively; see references in Section 2. Its analysis is intricate
because the limiting distribution of such a statistic depends discontinuously on the true value of Bθ.
One common way to get a critical value is to consider the globally least favorable case, which is θ = 0.
A less conservative strategy widely followed in the econometric literature on moment inequalities is
Generalized Moment Selection (GMS; see Andrews and Soares (2010), Bugni (2010), Canay (2010)).
If we had the H-representation of C, we might conceivably use the same technique. However, the
duality between the two representations is purely theoretical: In practice, B cannot be computed
from A in high-dimensional cases like our empirical application.
We therefore propose a tightening of the cone C that is computationally feasible and will have
a similar effect as GMS. The idea is to tighten the constraint on ν in (4.1). In particular, define
CτN := {Aν|ν ≥ τN1H/H} and define ηˆτN as
ηˆτN := argmin
η∈CτN
N [pˆi − η]′Ω[pˆi − η](4.4)
= argmin
Aν: [ν−τN1H/H]∈RH+
N [pˆi −Aν]′Ω[pˆi −Aν].
Our proof establishes that constraints in the H-representation that are almost binding at the original
problem’s solution (i.e., their slack is difficult to be distinguished from zero at the sample size) will be
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binding with zero slack after tightening. Suppose that
√
N(pˆi − pi)→d N(0, S) and let Sˆ consistently
estimate S. Let η˜τN := ηˆτN +
1√
N
N(0, Sˆ) or a bootstrap random variable and use the distribution of
J˜N := min
η∈CτN
N [η˜τN − η]′Ω[η˜τN − η](4.5)
= min
[ν−τN1H/H]∈RH+
N [η˜τN −Aν]′Ω[η˜τN −Aν],
to approximate the distribution of JN . This has the same theoretical justification as the inequality
selection procedure. Unlike the latter, however, it avoids the use of an H-representation, thus offering
a computationally feasible testing procedure.
To further illustrate the duality between H- and V-representations, we revisit the first two
examples. It is not possible to compute B-matrices in our empirical application.
Example 3.1 continued. With two intersecting budget planes, the cone C is represented by
(4.6) B =
x1|1 x2|1 x1|2 x2|2

−1 0 0 0
0 0 −1 0
−1 −1 1 1
1 1 −1 −1
1 0 0 −1
.
The first two rows of B are nonnegativity constraints (the other two such constraints are redundant),
the next two rows are an equality constraint forcing the sum of probabilities to be constant across
budgets, and only the last constraint is a substantive economic constraint. If the estimator pˆi fulfills the
first four constraints by construction, then the testing problem simplifies to a test of (1, 0, 0,−1)pi ≤ 0,
the same condition identified earlier.
Example 3.2 continued. Eliminating nonnegativity and adding-up constraints for brevity,
numerical evaluation reveals
(4.7) B =
x1|1 x2|1 x3|1 x4|1 x1|1 x1|2 x3|1 x4|1 x1|1 x2|1 x3|1 x4|1

1 1 0 0 0 −1 0 −1 0 0 0 0
0 −1 0 −1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 −1 0 −1
0 −1 −1 −1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 −1
.
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The first three rows are constraints on pairs of budgets that mirror the last row of (4.6). The next
two constraints are not implied by these, nor by additional constraints in Kawaguchi (2017), but they
imply the latter.
4.4. Theoretical Justification. We now provide a detailed justification. First, we formalize the
notion that choice probabilities are estimated by sample frequencies. Thus, for each budget set Bj ,
denote the choices of Nj individuals, indexed by n = 1, ..., Nj , by
di|j,n =
 1 if individual n chooses xi|j0 otherwise n = 1, ..., NJ .
Assume that one observes J random samples {{di|j,n}Iji=1}Njn=1, j = 1, 2, ..., J . For later use, define
dj,n :=

d1|j,n
...
dIj |j,n
 , N =
J∑
j=1
NJ .
An obvious way to estimate the vector pi is to use choice frequencies
(4.8) pˆii|j =
Nj∑
n=1
di|j,n/Nj , i = 1, ..., Ij , j = 1, ..., J.
The next lemma, among other things, shows that our tightening of the V-representation of C is
equivalent to a tightening its H-representation but leaving B unchanged. For a matrix B, let col(B)
denote its column space.
Lemma 4.1. For A ∈ RI×H , let
C = {Aν|ν ≥ 0}.
Also let
C = {t : Bt ≤ 0}
be its H-representation for some B ∈ Rm×I such that B =
B≤
B=
, where the submatrices B≤ ∈ Rm¯×I
and B= ∈ R(m−m¯)×I correspond to inequality and equality constraints, respectively. For τ > 0 define
Cτ = {Aν|ν ≥ (τ/H)1H}.
Then one also has
Cτ = {t : Bt ≤ −τφ}
21
for some φ = (φ1, ..., φm)
′ ∈ col(B) with the properties that (i) φ¯ := [φ1, ..., φm¯]′ ∈ Rm¯++, and (ii)
φk = 0 for k > m¯.
Lemma 4.1 is not just a re-statement of the Minkowski-Weyl theorem for polyhedra, which
would simply say Cτ = {Aν|ν ≥ (τ/H)1H} is alternatively represented as an intersection of closed
halfspaces. The lemma instead shows that the inequalities in the H-representation becomes tighter by
τφ after tightening the V-representation by τN1H/H, with the same matrix of coefficients B appearing
both for C and Cτ . Note that for notational convenience, we rearrange rows of B so that the genuine
inequalities come first and pairs of inequalities that represent equality constraints come last.10 This
is w.l.o.g.; in particular, the researcher does not need to know which rows of B these are. Then as we
show in the proof, the elements in φ corresponding to the equality constraints are automatically zero
when we tighten the space for all the elements of ν in the V-representation. This is a useful feature
that makes our methodology work in the presence of equality constraints.
The following assumptions are used for our asymptotic theory.
Assumption 4.1. For all j = 1, ..., J ,
Nj
N → ρj as N →∞, where ρj > 0.
Assumption 4.2. J repeated cross-sections of random samples
{
{di|j,n(j)}Iji=1
}Nj
n(j)=1
, j = 1, ..., J ,
are observed.
The econometrician also observes the normalized price vector pj , which is fixed in this section, for
each 1 ≤ j ≤ J . Let P denote the set of all pi’s that satisfy Condition S.1 in Appendix A for some
(common) value of (c1, c2).
Theorem 4.2. Choose τN so that τN ↓ 0 and
√
NτN ↑ ∞. Also, let Ω be diagonal, where all the
diagonal elements are positive. Then under Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2
lim inf
N→∞
inf
pi∈P∩C
Pr{JN ≤ cˆ1−α} = 1− α
where cˆ1−α is the 1− α quantile of J˜N , 0 ≤ α ≤ 12 .
While it is obvious that our tightening contracts the cone, the result depends on a more delicate
feature, namely that we (potentially) turn non-binding inequalities from the H-representation into
binding ones but not vice versa. This feature is not universal to cones as they get contracted. Our
proof establishes that it generally obtains if Ω is the identity matrix and all corners of the cone
10In the matrix displayed in (4.6), the third and fourth row would then come last.
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are acute. In this paper’s application, we can further exploit the cone’s geometry to extend the
result to any diagonal Ω.11 Our method immediately applies to other testing problems featuring
V-representations if analogous features can be verified.
5. Methods for Typical Survey Data
The methodology outlined in Section 4 requires that (i) the observations available to the econo-
metrician are drawn on a finite number of budgets and (ii) the budgets are given exogenously, that is,
unobserved heterogeneity and budgets are assumed to be independent. These conditions are naturally
satisfied in some applications. The empirical setting in Section 7, however, calls for modifications
because Condition (i) is certainly violated in it and imposing Condition (ii) would be very restrictive.
These are typical issues for a survey data set. This section addresses them.
Let Pu denote the marginal probability law of u, which we assume does not depend on j. We do
not, however, assume that the laws of other random elements, such as income, are time homogeneous.
Let w = log(W ) denote log total expenditure, and suppose the researcher chooses a value wj for w
for each period j. Note that our algorithm and asymptotic theory remain valid if multiple values of
w are chosen for each period. Let wn(j) be the log total expenditure of consumer n(j), 1 ≤ n(j) ≤ Nj
observed in period j.
Assumption 5.1. J repeated cross-sections of random samples
{(
{di|j,n(j)}Iji=1, wn(j)
)}Nj
n(j)=1
, j =
1, ..., J , are observed.
The econometrician also observes the unnormalized price vector p˜j , which is fixed, for each 1 ≤ j ≤ J .
We first assume that the total expenditure is exogenous, in the sense that w⊥ u holds under
every P (j), 1 ≤ j ≤ J . This exogeneity assumption will be relaxed shortly. Let pii|j(w) := Pr{di|j,n(j) =
1|wn(j) = wj} and writing pij := (pi1|j , ..., piIj |j)′ and pi := (pi′1, ..., pi′J)′ = (pi1|1, pi2|1, ..., piIJ |J)′, the
stochastic rationality condition is given by pi ∈ C as before. Note that this pi can be estimated
by standard nonparametric procedures. For concreteness, we use a series estimator, as defined and
11It is possible to replace Ω with its consistent estimator and retain uniform asymptotic validity, if we further impose
a restriction on the class of distributions over which we define the size of our test. Note, however, that our P in our
Theorem 4.2 (and its variants in Theorems 5.1 and 5.2) allows for some elements of the vector pi being zeros. This makes
the use of the reciprocals of estimated variances for the diagonals of the weighting matrix potentially problematic, as it
invalidates the asymptotic uniform validity since the required triangular CLT does not hold under parameter sequences
where the elements of pi converge to zeros. The use of fixed Ω, which we recommend in implementing our procedure,
makes contributions from these terms asymptotically negligible, thereby circumventing this problem.
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analyzed in Appendix A. The smoothed version of JN (also denoted JN for simplicity) is obtained
using the series estimator for pˆi in (4.1). In Appendix A we also present an algorithm for obtaining
the bootstrapped version J˜N of the smoothed statistic.
In what follows, Fj signifies the joint distribution of (di|j,n(j), wn(j)). Let F be the set of all
(F1, ..., FJ) that satisfy Condition S.2 in Appendix A for some (c1, c2, δ, ζ(·)).
Theorem 5.1. Let Condition S.3 hold. Also let Ω be diagonal where all the diagonal elements are
positive. Then under Assumptions 4.1 and 5.1
lim inf
N→∞
inf
(F1,...,FJ )∈F
Pr{JN ≤ cˆ1−α} = 1− α
where cˆ1−α is the 1− α quantile of J˜N , 0 ≤ α ≤ 12 .
Next, we relax the assumption that consumer’s utility functions are realized independently
from W . For each fixed value wj and the unnormalized price vector p˜j in period j, 1 ≤ j ≤ J , define
the endogeneity corrected conditional probability12
pi(p˜j/e
wj , xi|j) :=
∫
1{Dj(wj , u) ∈ xi|j}dPu
where Dj(w, u) := D(p˜j/e
w, u). Then Theorem 3.1 still applies to
piEC := [pi(p1, x1|1), ..., pi(p1, xI1|1), pi(p2, x1|2), ..., pi(p2, xI2|2), ..., pi(pJ , x1|J), ..., pi(pJ , xIJ |J)]
′.
Suppose there exists a control variable ε such that w⊥ u|ε holds under every P (j), 1 ≤ j ≤ J . See (S.8)
in Section A for an example. We propose to use a fully nonparametric, control function-based two-
step estimator, denoted by piEC, to define our endogeneity-corrected test statistic JECN ; see Appendix
A for details. For this, the bootstrap procedure needs to be adjusted appropriately to obtain the
bootstrapped statistic J˜ECN : once again, the reader is referred to Appendix A. This is the method
we use for the empirical results reported in Section 7. Let zn(j) be the n(j)-th observation of the
instrumental variable z in period j.
Assumption 5.2. J repeated cross-sections of random samples
{(
{di|j,n(j)}Iji=1, xn(j), zn(j)
)}Nj
n=1
, j =
1, ..., J , are observed.
The econometrician also observes the unnormalized price vector p˜j , which is fixed, for each 1 ≤ j ≤ J .
12This is the conditional choice probability if p is (counterfactually) assumed to be exogenous. We call it “endogeneity
corrected” instead of “counterfactual” to avoid confusion with rationality constrained, counterfactual prediction.
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In what follows, Fj signifies the joint distribution of (di|j,n(j), wn(j), zn(j)). Let FEC be the set of
all (F1, ..., FJ) that satisfy Condition S.4 in Appendix A for some (c1, c2, δ1, δ, ζr(·), ζs(·), ζ1(·)). Then
we have:
Theorem 5.2. Let Condition S.5 hold. Also let Ω be diagonal where all the diagonal elements are
positive. Then under Assumptions 4.1 and 5.2,
lim inf
N→∞
inf
(F1,...,FJ )∈FEC
Pr{JECN ≤ cˆ1−α} = 1− α
where cˆ1−α is the 1− α quantile of J˜ECN , 0 ≤ α ≤ 12 .
6. Monte Carlo Simulations
We next analyze the performance of Cone Tightening in a small Monte Carlo study. To keep
examples transparent and to focus on the core novelty, we model the idealized setting of Section 4, i.e.
sampling distributions are multinomial over patches. In addition, we focus on Example 3.2, for which
an H-representation in the sense of Weyl-Minkowski duality is available; see displays (3.2) and (4.7)
for the relevant matrices.13 This allows us to alternatively test rationalizability through a moment
inequalities test that ensures uniform validity through GMS.14
Data were generated from a total of 31 d.g.p.’s described below and for sample sizes of Nj ∈
{100, 200, 500, 1000}; recall that these are per budget, i.e. each simulated data set is based on 3 such
samples. The d.g.p.’s are parameterized by the pi-vectors reported in Table 2. They are related as
follows: pi0 is in the interior of C; pi2, pi4, and pi6 are outside it; and pi2, pi3, and pi5 are on its boundary.
Furthermore, pi1 = (pi0 + pi2)/2, pi3 = (pi0 + pi4)/2, and pi5 = (pi0 + pi6)/2. Thus, the line segment
connecting pi0 and pi2 intersects the boundary of C precisely at pi1 and similarly for the next two pairs
of vectors. We compute “power curves” along those 3 line segments at 11 equally spaced points, i.e.
changing mixture weights in increments of .1. This is replicated 500 times at a bootstrap size of
R = 499. Nominal size of the test is α = .05 throughout. Ideally, it should be exactly attained at the
vectors {pi1, pi3, pi5}.
13This is also true of Example 3.1, but that example is too simple because the test reduces to a one-sided test about
the sum of two probabilities, and the issues that motivate Cone Tightening or GMS go away. We verified that all testing
methods successfully recover this and achieve excellent size control, including if tuning parameters are set to 0.
14The implementation uses a “Modified Method of Moments” criterion function, i.e. S1 in the terminology of Andrews
and Soares (2010), and the hard thresholding GMS function, i.e. studentized intercepts above −κN were set to 0 and
all others to −∞. The tuning parameter is set to κN =
√
ln(Nj).
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pi0 pi1 pi2 pi3 pi4 pi5 pi6
x1|1 .181 .190 .2 .240 .3 .167 .152
x2|1 .226 .238 .25 .213 .2 .167 .107
x3|1 .226 .238 .25 .213 .2 .333 .441
x4|1 .367 .333 .3 .333 .3 .333 .3
x1|2 .181 .190 .2 .240 .3 .333 .486
x2|2 .226 .238 .25 .213 .2 .167 .107
x3|2 .226 .238 .25 .213 .2 .167 .107
x4|2 .367 .333 .3 .333 .3 .333 .3
x1|3 .181 .190 .2 .240 .3 .333 .486
x2|3 .226 .238 .25 .213 .2 .167 .107
x3|3 .226 .238 .25 .213 .2 .167 .107
x4|3 .367 .333 .3 .333 .3 .333 .3
Table 2. The pi-vectors used for the Monte Carlo simulations in Table 3.
Results are displayed in Table 3. Noting that the vectors are not too different, we would argue
that the simulations indicate reasonable power. Adjustments that ensure uniform validity of tests do
tend to cause conservatism for both GMS and cone tightening, but size control markedly improves
with sample size.15 While Cone Tightening appears less conservative than GMS in these simulations,
we caution that the tuning parameters and the distance metrics underlying the test statistics are not
directly comparable.
The differential performance across the three families of d.g.p.’s is expected because the d.g.p.’s
were designed to pose different challenges. For both pi1 and pi3, one constraint is binding and three
more are close enough to binding that, at the relevant sample sizes, they cannot be ignored. This
is more the case for pi3 compared to pi1. It means that GMS or Cone Tightening will be necessary,
but also that they are expected to be conservative. The vector pi5 has three constraints binding,
with two more somewhat close. This is a worst case for naive (not using Cone Tightening or GMS)
inference, which will rarely pick up all binding constraints. Indeed, we verified that inference with
τN = 0 or κN = 0 leads to overrejection. Finally, pi2 and pi4 fulfill the necessary conditions identified
15We attribute some very slight nonmonotonicities in the “power curves” to simulation noise.
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Method Nj pi0 · · · · pi1 · · · · pi2
Cone 100 .002 .004 .008 .008 .018 .024 .060 .110 .178 .238 .334
Tightening 200 0 0 .004 .008 .012 .040 .088 .164 .286 .410 .544
500 0 0 .004 .004 .026 .066 .166 .310 .500 .690 .856
1000 0 0 0 0 .010 .058 .206 .466 .764 .924 .984
GMS 100 0 0 0 .002 .004 .004 .010 .024 .032 .066 .100
200 0 0 0 0 .004 .010 .018 .048 .082 .174 .262
500 0 0 .002 .002 .026 .050 .150 .266 .442 .640 .814
1000 0 0 0 0 .008 .050 .194 .460 .758 .924 .976
Method Nj pi0 · · · · pi3 · · · · pi4
Cone 100 .002 .002 .008 .006 .012 .016 .036 .070 .098 .148 .200
Tightening 200 0 0 .004 .008 .010 .036 .068 .112 .194 .296 .404
500 0 0 .004 .004 .026 .064 .156 .296 .456 .664 .786
1000 0 0 0 0 .010 .058 .200 .460 .756 .916 .974
GMS 100 0 0 0 .002 .004 .004 .006 .018 .028 .066 .120
200 0 0 0 0 .004 .004 .012 .024 .056 .110 .216
500 0 0 .002 0 .004 .012 .034 .084 .196 .348 .544
1000 0 0 0 0 .002 .028 .080 .180 .406 .694 .892
Method Nj pi0 · · · · pi5 · · · · pi6
Cone 100 .002 .002 .006 .004 .020 .052 .126 .326 .548 .766 .934
Tightening 200 0 0 .002 .004 .008 .044 .202 .490 .836 .962 .996
500 0 0 .002 .004 .012 .072 .374 .880 .992 1 1
1000 0 0 0 0 .006 .052 .606 .992 1 1 1
GMS 100 0 0 0 .004 .008 .022 .072 .170 .388 .604 .808
200 0 0 0 0 .006 .020 .112 .300 .640 .880 .974
500 0 0 0 .002 .004 .072 .292 .716 .952 1 1
1000 0 0 0 0 0 .042 .498 .956 1 1 1
Table 3. Monte Carlo results. See Table 2 for definition of pi-vectors. Recall that
{pi1, pi3, pi5} are on the boundary of C and pi0 is interior to it. All entries computed
from 500 simulations and 499 replications per bootstrap.
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by Kawaguchi (2017), so that his test will have no asymptotic power at a parameter value in the first
two panels of Table 3.
7. Empirical Application
We apply our methods to data from the U.K. Family Expenditure Survey, the same data used
by BBC. Our testing of a RUM can, therefore, be compared with their revealed preference analysis of
a representative consumer. To facilitate this comparison, we use the same selection from these data,
namely the time periods from 1975 through 1999 and households with a car and at least one child.
The number of data points used varies from 715 (in 1997) to 1509 (in 1975), for a total of 26341.
For each year, we extract the budget corresponding to that year’s median expenditure and, following
Section 5, estimate the distribution of demand on that budget with polynomials of order 3. Like
BBC, we assume that all consumers in one year face the same prices, and we use the same price data.
While budgets have a tendency to move outward over time, there is substantial overlap of budgets at
median expenditure. To account for endogenous expenditure, we again follow Section 5, using total
household income as instrument. This is also the same instrument used in BBC (2008).
We present results for blocks of eight consecutive periods and the same three composite goods
(food, nondurable consumption goods, and services) considered in BBC.16 For all blocks of seven
consecutive years, we analyze the same basket but also increase the dimensionality of commodity
space to 4 or even 5. This is done by first splitting nondurables into clothing and other nondurables
and then further into clothing, alcoholic beverages, and other nondurables. Thus, the separability
assumptions that we (and others) implicitly invoke are successively relaxed. We are able to go further
than much of the existing literature in this regard because, while computational expense increases
with K, our approach is not subject to a statistical curse of dimensionality.17
Regarding the test’s statistical power, increasing the dimensionality of commodity space can
in principle cut both ways. The number of rationality constraints increases, and this helps if some of
the new constraints are violated but adds noise otherwise. Also, the maintained assumptions become
weaker: In principle, a rejection of stochastic rationalizability at 3 but not 4 goods might just indicate
a failure of separability.
16As a reminder, Figure 2 illustrates the application. The budget is the 1993 one as embedded in the 1986-1993 block
of periods, i.e. the figure corresponds to a row of Table 5.
17Tables 4 and 5 were computed in a few days on Cornell’s ECCO cluster (32 nodes). An individual cell of a table
can be computed in reasonable time on any desktop computer. Computation of a matrix A took up to one hour and
computation of one JN about five seconds on a laptop.
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3 goods 4 goods 5 goods
I H JN p I H JN p I H JN p
75-81 36 6409 3.67 .38 52 39957 5.43 .29 55 53816 4.75 .24
76-82 39 4209 11.6 .14 65 82507 5.75 .39 65 82507 5.34 .31
77-83 41 7137 9.81 .17 65 100728 6.07 .39 68 133746 4.66 .38
78-84 32 3358 7.38 .24 62 85888 2.14 .70 67 116348 1.45 .71
79-85 35 5628 .114 .96 71 202686 .326 .92 79 313440 .219 .94
80-86 38 7104 .0055 .998 58 68738 1.70 .81 66 123462 7.91 .21
81-87 26 713 .0007 .998 42 9621 .640 .89 52 28089 6.33 .27
82-88 15 42 0 1 21 177 .298 .60 31 1283 9.38 .14
83-89 13 14 0 1 15 31 .263 .49 15 31 9.72 .13
84-90 15 42 0 1 15 42 .251 .74 15 42 10.25 .24
85-91 15 63 .062 .77 19 195 3.59 .45 21 331 3.59 .44
86-92 24 413 1.92 .71 33 1859 7.27 .35 35 3739 9.46 .28
87-93 45 17880 1.33 .74 57 52316 6.60 .44 70 153388 6.32 .38
88-94 39 4153 1.44 .70 67 136823 6.95 .38 77 313289 6.91 .38
89-95 26 840 .042 .97 69 134323 4.89 .35 78 336467 5.84 .31
90-96 19 120 .040 .95 56 52036 4.42 .19 76 272233 3.55 .25
91-97 17 84 .039 .93 40 7379 3.32 .26 50 19000 3.27 .24
92-98 13 21 .041 .97 26 897 .060 .93 26 897 .011 .99
93-99 9 3 .037 .66 15 63 0 1 15 63 0 1
Table 4. Empirical results with 7 periods. I = number of patches, H = number of
rationalizable discrete demand vectors, JN = test statistic, p = p-value.
Tables 4 and 5 summarize our empirical findings. They display test statistics, p-values, and the
numbers I of patches and H of rationalizable demand vectors; thus, matrices A are of size (I ×H).
All entries that show JN = 0 and a corresponding p-value of 1 were verified to be true zeros, i.e.
pˆiEC is rationalizable. All in all, it turns out that estimated choice probabilities are typically not
stochastically rationalizable, but also that this rejection is not statistically significant.18
18In additional analyses not presented here, we replicated these tables using polynomials of degree 2, as well as setting
τN = 0. The qualitative finding of many positive but insignificant test statistics remains. In isolation, this finding may
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3 goods
I H JN p
75-82 51 71853 11.4 .17
76-83 64 114550 9.66 .24
77-84 52 57666 9.85 .20
78-85 49 76746 7.52 .26
79-86 55 112449 .114 .998
80-87 41 13206 3.58 .58
81-88 27 713 0 1
82-89 16 42 0 1
83-90 16 42 0 1
84-91 20 294 .072 .89
85-92 27 1239 2.24 .68
86-93 46 17880 1.54 .75
87-94 48 39913 1.55 .75
88-95 42 12459 1.68 .70
89-96 27 840 .047 .97
90-96 24 441 .389 .83
91-98 22 258 1.27 .52
92-99 14 21 .047 .96
Table 5. Empirical results with 8 periods. I = number of patches, H = number of
rationalizable discrete demand vectors, JN = test statistic, p = p-value.
We identified a mechanism that may explain this phenomenon. Consider the 84-91 entry in
Table 5, where JN is especially low. It turns out that one patch on budget B5 is below B8 and two
patches on B8 are below B5. By the reasoning of Example 3.1, probabilities of these patches must
raise questions about the test’s power. However, the test exhibits reasonable power in our Monte Carlo exercise and also
rejects rationalizability in an empirical application elsewhere (Hubner 2018).
We also checked whether small but positive test statistics are caused by adding-up constraints, i.e. by the fact that all
components of pi that correspond to one budget must jointly be on some unit simplex. The estimator pˆi can slightly
violate this. Adding-up failures occur but are at least one order of magnitude smaller than the distance from a typical
pˆi to the corresponding projection ηˆ.
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add to less than 1. The estimated sum equals 1.006, leading to a tiny and statistically insignificant
violation. This phenomenon occurs frequently and seems to cause the many positive but insignificant
values of JN . The frequency of its occurrence, in turn, has a simple cause that may also appear
in other data: If two budgets are slight rotations of each other and demand distributions change
continuously in response, then population probabilities of patches like the above will sum to just less
than 1. If these probabilities are estimated independently across budgets, the estimates will frequently
add to slightly more than 1. With 7 or 8 mutually intersecting budgets, there are many opportunities
for such reversals, and positive but insignificant test statistics may become ubiquitous.
The phenomenon of estimated choice frequencies typically not being rationalizable means that
there is need for a statistical testing theory and also a theory of rationality constrained estimation.
The former is this paper’s main contribution. We leave the latter for future research.
8. Conclusion
This paper presented asymptotic theory and computational tools for nonparametric testing of
Random Utility Models. Again, the null to be tested was that data was generated by a RUM, inter-
preted as describing a heterogeneous population, where the only restrictions imposed on individuals’
behavior were “more is better” and SARP. In particular, we allowed for unrestricted, unobserved
heterogeneity and stopped far short of assumptions that would recover invertibility of demand. We
showed that testing the model is nonetheless possible. The method is easily adapted to choice prob-
lems that are discrete to begin with, and one can easily impose more, or fewer, restrictions at the
individual level.
Possibilities for extensions and refinements abound, and some of these have already been ex-
plored. We close by mentioning further salient issues.
(1) We provide algorithms (and code) that work for reasonably sized problem, but it would be
extremely useful to make further improvements in this dimension.
(2) The extension to infinitely many budgets is of obvious interest. Theoretically, it can be handled by
considering an appropriate discretization argument (McFadden 2005). For the proposed projection-
based econometric methodology, such an extension requires evaluating choice probabilities locally over
points in the space of p via nonparametric smoothing, then use the choice probability estimators in the
calculation of the JN -statistic. The asymptotic theory then needs to be modified. Another approach
that can mitigate the computational constraint is to consider a partition of the space of p such that
RK+ = P1 ∪ P2 · · · ∪ PM . Suppose we calculate the JN -statistic for each of these partitions. Given
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the resulting M -statistics, say J 1N , · · · ,JMN , we can consider JmaxN := max1≤m≤M JmN or a weighted
average of them. These extensions and their formal statistical analysis are of practical interest.
(3) While we allow for endogenous expenditure and therefore for the distribution of u to vary with
observed expenditure, we do assume that samples for all budgets are drawn from the same underlying
population. This assumption can obviously not be dropped completely. However, it will frequently
be of interest to impose it only conditionally on observable covariates, which must then be controlled
for. This may be especially relevant for cases where different budgets correspond to independent
markets, but also to adjust for slow demographic change as does, strictly speaking, occur in our data.
It requires incorporating nonparametric smoothing in estimating choice probabilities as in Section 5,
then averaging the corresponding JN -statistics over the covariates. This extension will be pursued.
(4) Natural next steps after rationality testing are extrapolation to (bounds on) counterfactual demand
distributions and welfare analysis, i.e. along the lines of BBC (2008) or, closer to our own setting,
Adams (2016) and Deb, Kitamura, Quah, and Stoye (2018). This extension is being pursued. Indeed,
the tools from Section 3 have already been used for choice extrapolation (using algorithms from an
earlier version of this paper) in Manski (2014).
(5) The econometric techniques proposed here can be potentially useful in much broader contexts.
Indeed, they have already been used to nonparametrically test game theoretic model with strategic
complementarities (Lazzati, Quah, and Shirai 2018a, Lazzati, Quah, and Shirai 2018b), a novel model
of “price preference” (Deb, Kitamura, Quah, and Stoye 2018), and the collective household model
(Hubner 2018). Even more generally, existing proposals for testing in moment inequality models
(Andrews and Guggenberger 2009, Andrews and Soares 2010, Bugni, Canay, and Shi 2015, Romano
and Shaikh 2010) work with explicit inequality constraints, i.e. (in the linear case) H-representations.
In settings in which theoretical restrictions inform a V-representation of a cone or, more generally,
a polyhedron, the H-representation will typically not be available in practice. We expect that our
method can be used in many such cases.
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S1
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS
Appendix A: Proofs and Further Details of Inferential Procedures
Proof of Theorem 3.1. The proof uses nonstochastic demand systems, which can be identified with
vectors (d1, . . . , dJ) ∈ B1 × · · · × BJ . Such a system is rationalizable if dj ∈ arg maxy∈Bj u(y), j =
1, . . . , J for some utility function u.
Rationalizability of nonstochastic demand systems is well understood. In particular, and ir-
respective of whether we define rationalizability by GARP or SARP, it is decidable from knowing
the preferences directly revealed by choices, hence from knowing patches containing (d1, . . . , dJ). It
follows that for all nonstochastic demand systems that select from the same patches, either all or none
are rationalizable.
Fix (P1, ..., PJ). Let the set Y∗ collect one “representative” element (e.g., the geometric center
point) of each patch. Let (P ∗1 , ..., P ∗J ) be the unique stochastic demand system concentrated on Y∗ and
having the same vector representation as (P1, ..., PJ). The previous paragraph established that demand
systems can be arbitrarily perturbed within patches, so (P1, ..., PJ) is rationalizable iff (P
∗
1 , ..., P
∗
J ) is.
It follows that rationalizability of (P1, ..., PJ) can be decided from its vector representation pi, and
that it suffices to analyze stochastic demand systems supported on Y∗.
Now, any stochastic demand system is rationalizable iff it is a mixture of rationalizable non-
stochastic ones. Since Y∗ is finite, there are finitely many nonstochastic demand systems supported
on it; of these, a subset will be rationalizable. Noting that these demand systems are characterized
by binary vector representations corresponding to columns of A, the statement of the Theorem is
immediate for the restricted class of stochastic demand systems supported on Y∗. 
Proof of Theorem 3.2. We begin with some preliminary observations. Throughout this proof, c(Bi)
denotes the object actually chosen from budget Bi.
(i) If there is a choice cycle of any finite length, then there is a cycle of length 2 or 3 (where
a cycle of length 2 is a WARP violation). To see this, assume there exists a length N choice cycle
c(Bi)  c(Bj)  c(Bk)  ...  c(Bi). If c(Bk)  c(Bi), then a length 3 cycle has been discovered. Else,
there exists a length N − 1 choice cycle c(Bi)  c(Bk)  ...  c(Bi). The argument can be iterated
until N = 4.
(ii) Call a length 3 choice cycle irreducible if it does not contain a length 2 cycle. Then a choice
pattern is rationalizable iff it contains no length 2 cycles and also no irreducible length 3 cycles. (In
particular, one can ignore reducible length 3 cycles.) This follows trivially from (i).
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(iii) Let J = 3 and M = 1, i.e. assume there are three budgets but two of them fail to
intersect. Then any length 3 cycle is reducible. To see this, assume w.l.o.g. that B1 is below B3,
thus c(B3)  c(B1) by monotonicity. If there is a choice cycle, we must have c(B1)  c(B2)  c(B3).
c(B1)  c(B2) implies that c(B2) is below B1, thus it is below B3. c(B2)  c(B3) implies that c(B3) is
below B2. Thus, choice from (B2,B3) violates WARP.
We are now ready to prove the main result. The nontrivial direction is “only if,” thus it suffices
to show the following: If choice from (B1, ...,BJ−1) is rationalizable but choice from (B1, ...,BJ) is not,
then choice from (BM+1, ...,BJ) cannot be rationalizable. By observation (ii), if (B1, ...,BJ) is not
rationalizable, it contains either a 2-cycle or an irreducible 3-cycle. Because choice from all triplets
within (B1, ...,BJ−1) is rationalizable by assumption, it is either the case that some (Bi,BJ) constitutes
a 2-cycle or that some triplet (Bi,Bk,BJ), where i < k w.l.o.g., reveals an irreducible choice cycle.
In the former case, Bi must intersect BJ , hence i > M , hence the conclusion. In the latter case, if
k ≤M , the choice cycle must be a 2-cycle in (Bi,Bk), contradicting rationalizability of (B1, ...,BJ−1).
If i ≤M , the choice cycle is reducible by (iii). Thus, i > M , hence the conclusion. 
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Letting ντ = ν − (τ/H)1H in Cτ = {Aν|ν ≥ (τ/H)1H} we have
Cτ = {A[ντ + (τ/H)1H ]|ντ ≥ 0}
= C ⊕ (τ/H)A1H
= {t : t− (τ/H)A1H ∈ C}
where ⊕ signifies Minkowski sum. Define
φ = −BA1H/H.
Using the H-representation of C,
Cτ = {t : B(t− (τ/H)A1H) ≤ 0}
= {t : Bt ≤ −τφ}.
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Note that the above definition of φ implies φ ∈ col(B). Also define
Φ := −BA
= −

b′1
...
b′m
 [a1, · · · , aH ]
= {Φkh}
where Φkh = b
′
kah, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, 1 ≤ h ≤ H and let eh be the h-th standard unit vector in RH . Since
eh ≥ 0, the V-representation of C implies that Aeh ∈ C, and thus
BAeh ≤ 0
by its H-representation. Therefore
(S.1) Φkh = −e′kBAeh ≥ 0, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, 1 ≤ h ≤ H.
But if k ≤ m¯, it cannot be that
aj ∈ {x : b′kx = 0} for all j
whereas
b′kah = 0
holds for m¯ + 1 ≤ k ≤ m, 1 ≤ h ≤ H. Therefore if k ≤ m¯, Φkh = b′kah is nonzero at least for one
h, 1 ≤ h ≤ H, whereas if k > m¯, Φkh = 0 for every h. Since (S.1) implies that all of {Φkh}Hh=1 are
non-negative, we conclude that
φk =
1
H
H∑
h=1
Φkh > 0
for every k ≤ m¯ and φk = 0 for every k > m¯. We now have
Cτ = {t : Bt ≤ −τφ}
where φ satisfies the stated properties (i) and (ii). 
Before we present the proof of Theorem 4.2, it is necessary to specify a class of distributions,
to which we impose a mild condition that guarantees stable behavior of the statistic JN . To this
end, we further specify the nature of each row of B. Recall that w.l.o.g. the first m¯ rows of B
correspond to inequality constraints, whereas the rest of the rows represent equalities. Note that
the m¯ inequalities include nonnegativity constraints pii|j ≥ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ Ij , 1 ≤ j ≤ J , represented by
the row of B consisting of a negative constant for the corresponding element and zeros otherwise.
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Likewise, the identities that
∑Ij
i=1 pii|j is constant across 1 ≤ j ≤ J are included in the set of equality
constraints.19 We show in the proof that the presence of these “definitional” equalities/inequalities,
which always hold by construction of pˆi, do not affect the asymptotic theory even when they are (close
to) be binding. Define K = {1, ...,m}, and let KD be the set of indices for the rows of B corresponding
to the above nonnegativity constraints and the constant-sum constraints. Let KR = K \ KD, so that
b′kpi ≤ 0 represents an economic restriction if k ∈ KR.20 Recalling the choice vectors (dj|1, ..., dj|Nj )
are IID-distributed within each time period j, 1 ≤ j ≤ J , let dj denote the choice vector of a consumer
facing budget j (therefore w.l.o.g we can let dj = dj|1). Define d = [d′1, ..., d′J ]
′, a random I-vector of
binary variables. Note E[d] = pi. Let
g = Bd
= [g1, ..., gm]
′.
With these definitions, consider the following requirement:
Condition S.1. For each k ∈ KR, var(gk) > 0 and E[|gk/
√
var(gk)|2+c1 ] < c2 hold, where c1 and c2
are positive constants.
This type of condition is standard in the literature; see, for example, Andrews and Soares (2010).
Proof of Theorem 4.2. By applying the Minkowski-Weyl theorem and Lemma 4.1 to JN and
J˜N (τN ), we see that our procedure is equivalent to comparing
JN = min
t∈RI :Bt≤0
N [pˆi − t]′Ω[pˆi − t]
to the 1− α quantile of the distribution of
J˜N = min
t∈RI :Bt≤−τNφ
N [η˜τN − t]′Ω[η˜τN − t]
with φ = [φ¯′, (0, ..., 0)′]′, φ¯ ∈ Rm¯++, where
η˜τN = ηˆτN +
1√
N
N(0, Sˆ),
ηˆτN = argmin
t∈RI :Bt≤−τNφ
N [pˆi − t]′Ω[pˆi − t].
19If we impose the (redundant) restriction 1′Hν = 1 in the definition of C, then the corresponding equality restrictions
would be
∑Ij
i=1 pii|j = 1 for every j.
20In (4.6), KR contains only the last row of the matrix.
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Suppose B has m rows and rank(B) = `. Define an `×m matrix K such that KB is a matrix whose
rows consist of a basis of the row space row(B). Also let M be an (I − `)× I matrix whose rows form
an orthonormal basis of kerB = ker(KB), and define P =
(
KB
M
)
. Finally, let gˆ = Bpˆi and hˆ = Mpˆi.
Then
JN = min
Bt≤0
N
[(
KB
M
)
(pˆi − t)
]′
P−1′ΩP−1
[(
KB
M
)
(pˆi − t)
]
= min
Bt≤0
N
(
K[gˆ −Bt]
hˆ−Mt
)′
P−1′ΩP−1
(
K[gˆ −Bt]
hˆ−Mt
)
.
Let
U1 =
{(
Kγ
h
)
: γ = Bt, h = Mt,B≤t ≤ 0, B=t = 0, t ∈ RI
}
then writing α = KBt and h = Mt,
JN = min
(αh)∈U1
N
(
Kgˆ − α
hˆ− h
)′
P−1′ΩP−1
(
Kgˆ − α
hˆ− h
)
.
Also define
U2 =
{(
Kγ
h
)
: γ =
(
γ≤
γ=
)
, γ≤ ∈ Rm¯+ , γ= = 0, γ ∈ col(B), h ∈ RI−`
}
where col(B) denotes the column space of B. Obviously U1 ⊂ U2. Moreover, U2 ⊂ U1 holds. To see
this, let
(
Kγ∗
h∗
)
be an arbitrary element of U2. We can always find t∗ ∈ RI such that γ∗ = Bt∗. Define
t∗∗ := t∗ +M ′h∗ −M ′Mt∗
then Bt∗∗ = Bt∗ = γ∗, therefore B≤t∗∗ ≤ 0 and B=t∗∗ = 0. Also, Mt∗∗ = Mt∗+MM ′h∗−MM ′Mt∗ =
h∗, therefore
(
Kγ∗
h∗
)
is an element of U1 as well. Consequently,
U1 = U2.
We now have
JN = min
(αh)∈U2
N
(
Kgˆ − α
hˆ− h
)′
P−1′ΩP−1
(
Kgˆ − α
hˆ− h
)
= N min
(αy)∈U2
(
Kgˆ − α
y
)′
P−1′ΩP−1
(
Kgˆ − α
y
)
.
Define
T (x, y) =
(
x
y
)′
P−1′ΩP−1
(
x
y
)
, x ∈ R`, y ∈ RI−`,
and
t(x) := min
y∈RI−`
T (x, y), s(g) := min
γ=[γ≤′,γ=′]′,γ≤≤0,γ==0,γ∈col(B)
t(K[g − γ]).
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It is easy to see that t : R` → R+ is a positive definite quadratic form. We can write
JN = N min
γ=[γ≤′,γ=′]′,γ≤≤0,γ==0,γ∈col(B)
t(K[gˆ − γ])
= Ns(gˆ)
= s(
√
Ngˆ).
We now show that tightening can turn non-binding inequality constraints into binding ones but not
vice versa. Note that, as will be seen below, this observation uses diagonality of Ω and the specific
geometry of the cone C. Let γˆkτN , gˆk and φk denote the k-th elements of γˆτN = BηˆτN , gˆ and φ.
Moreover, define γτ (g) = [γ
1(g), ..., γm(g)]′ = argminγ=[γ≤′,γ=′]′,γ≤≤−τφ¯,γ==0,γ∈col(B) t(K[g − γ]) for
g ∈ col(B), and let γkτ (g) be its k-th element. Then γˆτN = γτN (gˆ). Finally, define βτ (g) = γτ (g) + τφ
for τ > 0 and let βkτ (g) denote its k-th element. Note γ
k
τ (g) = φ
k = βkτ (g) = 0 for every k > m¯ and g.
Now we show that for each k ≤ m¯ and for some δ > 0,
βkτ (g) = 0
if |gk| ≤ τδ and gj ≤ τδ, 1 ≤ j ≤ m¯. In what follows we first show this for the case with Ω = II , where
II denotes the I-dimensional identity matrix, then generalize the result to the case where Ω can have
arbitrary positive diagonal elements.
For τ > 0 and δ > 0 define hyperplanes
Hτk = {x : b′kx = −τφk},
Hk = {x : b′kx = 0},
half spaces
Hτ∠k(δ) = {x : b′kx ≤ τδ},
and also
Sk(δ) = {x ∈ C : |b′kx| ≤ τδ}
for 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Define
L = ∩mk=m¯+1Hk,
a linear subspace of RI . In what follows we show that for small enough δ > 0, every element x∗ ∈ RI
such that
(S.2) x∗ ∈ S1(δ) ∩ · · · ∩ Sq(δ) ∩Hτ∠q+1(δ) ∩ · · ·Hτ∠m(δ) for some q ∈ {1, ..., m¯}
S7
satisfies
(S.3) x∗|Cτ ∈ Hτ1 ∩ · · · ∩Hτq ∩ L
where x∗|Cτ denotes the orthogonal projection of x∗ on Cτ . Let g∗k = b′kx∗, k = 1, ...,m. Note that an
element x∗ fulfills (S.2) iff |g∗k| ≤ τδ, 1 ≤ k ≤ q and g∗j ≤ τδ, q + 1 ≤ j ≤ m¯. Likewise, (S.3) holds
iff βτk (g
∗) = 0, 1 ≤ k ≤ q (recall βτk (g∗) = 0 always holds for k > m¯). Thus in order to establish the
desired property of the function βτ (·), we show that (S.2) implies (S.3). Suppose it does not hold;
then without loss of generality, for an element x∗ that satisfies (S.2) for an arbitrary small δ > 0, we
have
(S.4) x∗|Cτ ∈ Hτ1 ∩ · · · ∩Hτr ∩ L and x∗|Cτ /∈ Hτj , r + 1 ≤ j ≤ q
for some 1 ≤ r ≤ q − 1. Define halfspaces
Hτ∠k = {x : b′kx ≤ −τφk},
H∠k = {x : b′kx ≤ 0}
for 1 ≤ k ≤ m, τ > 0 and also let
F = H1 ∩ · · · ∩Hr ∩ C,
then for (S.4) to hold for some x∗ ∈ RI satisfying (S.2) for an arbitrary small δ > 0 we must have
F | (Hτ1 ∩ · · · ∩Hτr ∩ L) ⊂ int(Hτ∠r+1 ∩ · · · ∩Hτ∠q)
(Recall the notation | signifies orthogonal projection. Also note that if dim(F ) = 1, then (S.4) does
not occur under (S.2).) Therefore if we let
∆(J) = {x ∈ RI : 1′Ix = J, x ≥ 0},
i.e. the simplex with vertices (J, 0, · · · , 0), · · · , (0, · · · , 0, J), we have
(S.5) (F ∩∆(J)) | (Hτ1 ∩ · · · ∩Hτr ∩ L) ⊂ int(Hτ∠r+1 ∩ · · · ∩Hτ∠q).
Let {a1, ..., aH} = A denote the collection of the column vectors of A. Then {the vertices of F ∩
∆(J)} ∈ A. Let a¯, a¯ ∈ F ∩∆(J). Let B(ε, x) denote the ε-(open) ball with center x ∈ RI . By (S.5),
B
(
ε,
(
a¯| ∩rj=1 Hτj ∩ L
)) ⊂ int(Hτ∠r+1 ∩ · · · ∩Hτ∠q) ∩H∠1 ∩ · · · ∩H∠r
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holds for small enough ε > 0. Let a¯τ := a¯+ τHA1H , a¯
τ := a¯+ τHA1H , then((
a¯|(∩rj=1Hτj ) ∩ L
)− a¯)′ (a¯− a¯) = ((a¯|(∩rj=1Hτj ) ∩ L)− a¯)′ (a¯τ − a¯τ )
= 0
since a¯τ , a¯τ ∈ (∩rj=1Hτj )∩L. We can then take z ∈ B
(
ε,
(
a¯|(∩rj=1Hτj ) ∩ L
))
such that (z−a¯)′(a¯−a¯) <
0. By construction z ∈ C, which implies the existence of a triplet (a, a¯, a¯) of distinct elements in A
such that (a − a¯)′(a¯ − a¯) < 0. In what follows we show that this cannot happen, then the desired
property of βτ is established.
So let us now show that
(S.6) (a1 − a0)′(a2 − a0) ≥ 0 for every triplet (a0, a1, a2) of distinct elements in A.
Noting that a′iaj just counts the number of budgets on which i and j agree, define
φ(ai, aj) = J − a′iaj ,
the number of disagreements. Importantly, note that φ(ai, aj) = φ(aj , ai) and that φ is a distance (it
is the taxicab distance between elements in A, which are all 0-1 vectors). Now
(a1 − a0)′(a2 − a0)
= a′1a2 − a′0a2 − a′1a0 + a′0a0
= J − φ(a1, a2)− (J − φ(a0, a2))− (J − φ(a0, a1)) + J
= φ(a0, a2) + φ(a0, a1)− φ(a1, a2) ≥ 0
by the triangle inequality.
Next we treat the case where Ω is not necessarily II . Write
Ω =

ω21 0 . . . 0
0 ω22 . . . 0
. . .
0 . . . 0 ω2I
 .
The statistic JN in (4.1) can be rewritten, using the square-root matrix Ω1/2,
JN = min
η∗=Ω1/2η:η∈C
[pˆi∗ − η∗]′[pˆi∗ − η∗]
or
JN = min
η∗∈C∗
[pˆi∗ − η∗]′[pˆi∗ − η∗]
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where
C∗ = {Ω1/2Aν|ν ≥ 0}
= {A∗ν|ν ≥ 0}
with
A∗ = [a∗1, ..., a
∗
H ], a
∗
h = Ω
1/2ah, 1 ≤ h ≤ H.
Then we can follow our previous argument replacing a’s with a∗’s, and using
∆∗(J) = conv([0, ..., ωi, ....0]′ ∈ RI , i = 1, ..., I).
instead of the simplex ∆(J). Finally, we need to verify that the acuteness condition (S.6) holds for
A∗ = {a∗1, ..., a∗H}.
For two I-vectors a and b, define a weighted taxicab metric
φΩ(a, b) :=
I∑
i=1
ωi|ai − bi|,
then the standard taxicab metric φ used above is φΩ with Ω = II . Moreover, letting a
∗ = Ω1/2a and
b∗ = Ω1/2b, where each of a and b is an I-dimensional 0-1 vector, we have
a∗′b∗ =
I∑
i=1
ωi[1− |ai − bi|] = ω¯ − φΩ(a, b)
with ω¯ =
∑I
i=1 ωi. Then for every triplet (a
∗
0, a
∗
1, a
∗
2) of distinct elements in A∗
(a∗1 − a∗0)′(a∗2 − a∗0) = ω¯ − φΩ(a1, a2)− ω¯ + φΩ(a0, a2)− ω¯ + φΩ(a0, a1) + ω¯ − φΩ(a0, a0)
= φΩ(a1, a2)− φΩ(a0, a2)− φΩ(a0, a1)
≥ 0,
which is the desired acuteness condition. Since JN can be written as the minimum of the quadratic
form with identity-matrix weighting subject to the cone generated by a∗’s, all the previous arguments
developed for the case with Ω = II remain valid.
Defining ξ ∼ N(0, Sˆ) and ζ = Bξ,
J˜N ∼ min
Bt≤−τNφ
N
[(
KB
M
)
(ηˆτN +N
−1/2ξ − t)
]′
P−1′ΩP−1
[(
KB
M
)
(ηˆτN +N
−1/2ξ − t)
]
= N min
γ=[γ≤′,γ=′]′,γ≤≤−τN φ¯,γ==0,γ∈col(B)
t
(
K
[
γˆτN +N
−1/2ζ − γ
])
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conditional on data {{di|j,n}Iji=1}Njn=1, j = 1, 2, ..., J . Moreover, defining γτ = γ + τNφ in the above,
and using the definitions of βτ (·) and s(·)
J˜N ∼ N min
γτ=[γτ≤′,γτ=′]′,γτ≤≤0,γτ==0,γτ∈col(B)
t
(
K
[
γˆτN + τNφ+N
−1/2ζ − γτ
])
= N min
γτ=[γτ≤′,γτ=′]′,γτ≤≤0,γτ==0,γτ∈col(B)
t
(
K
[
γτN (gˆ) + τNφ+N
−1/2ζ − γτ
])
= N min
γτ=[γτ≤′,γτ=′]′,γτ≤≤0,γτ==0,γτ∈col(B)
t
(
K
[
βτN (gˆ) +N
−1/2ζ − γτ
])
= s
(
N1/2βτN (gˆ) + ζ
)
Let ϕN (ξ) := N
1/2βτN (τNξ) for ξ = (ξ1, ..., ξm)
′ ∈ col(B), then from the property of βτ shown above,
its k-th element ϕkN for k ≤ m¯ satisfies
ϕkN (ξ) = 0
if |ξk| ≤ δ and ξj ≤ δ, 1 ≤ j ≤ m for large enough N . Note ϕkN (ξ) = N1/2βkN (τNξ) = 0 for k > m¯.
Define ξˆ := gˆ/τN and using the definition of ϕN , we write
(S.7) J˜N ∼ s
(
ϕN (ξˆ) + ζ
)
.
Now we invoke Theorem 1 of Andrews and Soares (2010, AS henceforth). As noted before, the
function t is a positive definite quadratic form on R`, and so is its restriction on col(B). Then
their Assumptions 1-3 hold for the function s defined above if signs are adjusted appropriately as
our formulae deal with negativity constraints, whereas AS work with positivity constraints. (Note
that Assumption 1(b) does not apply here since we use a fixed weighting matrix.) The function ϕN
in (S.7) satisfies the properties of ϕ in AS used in their proof of Theorem 1. AS imposes a set of
restrictions on the parameter space (see their Equation (2.2) on page 124). Their condition (2.2) (vii) is
a Lyapounov condition for a triangular array CLT. Following AS, consider a sequence of distributions
piN = [pi
′
1N , ..., pi
′
JN ]
′, N = 1, 2, ... in P ∩ C such that (1) √NBpiN → h for a non-positive h as N →∞
and (2) CovpiN (
√
NBpˆi) → Σ as N → ∞ where Σ is positive semidefinite. The Lyapounov condition
holds for b′kpˆi under piN for k ∈ KR as Condition S.1 is imposed for piN ∈ P. We do not impose
Condition S.1 for k ∈ KD. Note, however, that: (i) The equality b′kpˆi ≤ 0 holds by construction for
every k ∈ KD and therefore its behavior does not affect JN ; (ii) If varpiN (gk) converges to zero for
some k ∈ KD, then √Nb′k[η˜τN − ηˆτN ] = op(1) and therefore its contribution to J˜N is asymptotically
negligible in the size calculation. The other conditions in AS10, namely (2.2)(i)-(vi), hold trivially.
Finally, Assumptions GMS 2 and GMS 4 of AS10 are concerned with their thresholding parameter
S11
κN for the k-th moment inequality, and by letting κN = N
1/2τNφk, the former holds by the condition√
NτN ↑ ∞ and the latter by τN ↓ 0. Therefore we conclude
lim inf
N→∞
inf
pi∈P∩C
Pr{JN ≤ cˆ1−α} = 1− α.

Further details of the procedure in Section 5 The setting in this section is as follows. Let p˜j ∈
RK++ denote the unnormalized price vector, fixed for each period j. Let (S,S, P ) denote the underlying
probability space. Since we have repeated cross-sections over J periods, write P = ⊗Jj=1P (j), a J-fold
product measure.
We first develop a smoothing procedure based on a series estimator (see, for example, Newey
(1997)) for pi to deal with a situation where total expenditure W is continuously distributed, yet
exogenous. We need some notation and definitions to formally state the asymptotic theory behind
our procedure with smoothing. With exogeneity we have
pi|j(wj) = Pr{D(p˜j/wn(j), u) ∈ xi|j |wn(j) = wj}
= Pr{D(p˜j/wj , u) ∈ xi|j , u ∼ Pu}
where the second equality follows from the exogeneity assumption. Then pii|j = pi|j(wj), which is
the estimand in what follows. Define qK(w) = (q1K(w), ..., qKK(w))
′, where qjK(w), j = 1, ...,K are
basis functions (e.g. power series or splines) of w. Instead of sample frequency estimators, for each
j, 1 ≤ j ≤ J we use
pˆii|j = qK(j)(wj)
′Q̂−(j)
Nj∑
n(j)=1
qK(j)(wn(j))di|j,n(j)/Nj ,
Q̂(j) =
Nj∑
n(j)=1
qK(j)(wn(j))q
K(j)(wn(j))
′/Nj
pˆij = (pˆi1|j , ..., pˆiIj |j)
′,
pˆi = (pˆi′1, ..., pˆi
′
J)
′,
to estimate pii|j , where A− denotes a symmetric generalized inverse of A and K(j) is the number of
basis functions applied to Budget Bj . The estimators pˆii|j ’s may not take their values in [0, 1]. This
does not seem to cause a problem asymptotically, though as in Imbens and Newey (2009), we may
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(and do, in the application) instead use
pˆii|j = G
qK(j)(wj)′Q̂−(j) Nj∑
n(j)=1
qK(j)(wn(j))di|j,n(j)/Nj
 ,
where G denotes the CDF of Unif(0, 1). Then an appropriate choice of τN is τN =
√
logn
n with
n = min
j
NjIj/trace(v
(j)
N )
where v
(j)
N is defined below. Strictly speaking, asymptotics with nonparametric smoothing involve
bias, and the bootstrap does not solve the problem. A standard procedure is to claim that one used
undersmoothing and can hence ignore the bias, and we follow this convention. The bootstrapped test
statistic J˜N is obtained applying the same replacements to the formula (4.5), although generating
η˜τN requires a slight modification. Let ηˆτN (j) be the j-th block of the vector ηˆτN , and vˆ
(j)
N satisfy
vˆ
(j)
N v
(j)
N
−1 →p IIj , where
v
(j)
N = [IIj ⊗ qK(j)(wj)′QN (j)−1]Λ(j)N [IIj ⊗Q−1N (j)qK(j)(wj)]
with QN (j) := E[q
K(j)(wn(j))q
K(j)(wn(j))
′
], Λ
(j)
N := E[Σ
(j)(wn(j)) ⊗ qK(j)(wn(j))qK(j)(wn(j))′], and
Σ(j)(w) := Cov[dj,n(j)|wn(j) = w]. Note that Σ(j)(w) = diag
(
p(j)(w)
)−p(j)(w)p(j)(w)′ where p(j)(w) =
[p1|j(w), ..., pIj |j(w)]
′. For example, one may use
vˆ
(j)
N = [IIj ⊗ qK(j)(wj)′Qˆ−(j)]Λ̂(j)[IIj ⊗ Qˆ−(j)qK(j)(wj)]
with Λ̂(j) = 1Nj
∑Nj
n(j)=1
[
Σ̂(j)(wn(j))⊗ qK(j)(wn(j))qK(j)(wn(j))′
]
, Σ̂(j)(w) = diag
(
p̂(j)(w)
)−p̂(j)(w)p̂(j)(w)′,
p̂(j)(w) = [p̂1|j(w), ..., p̂Ij |j(w)]
′ and p̂i|j(w) = qK(j)(w)′Q̂−(j)
∑Nj
n(j)=1 q
K(j)(wn(j))di|j,n(j)/Nj . We use
η˜τN = (η˜τN (1)
′, ..., η˜τN (J)
′)′ for the smoothed version of J˜N , where η˜τN (j) := ηˆτN (j)+
1√
Nj
N(0, vˆ
(j)
N ), j =
1, ..., J .
Noting {{di|j,n(j)}Iji=1, wn(j)}Njn(j)=1 are IID-distributed within each time period j, 1 ≤ j ≤ J , let
(dj , wj) denote the choice-log-expenditure pair of a consumer facing budget j. Let d = [d
′
1, ..., d
′
J ]
′ and
w = [w1, ..., wJ ]
′, and define g = Bd = [g1, ..., gm]′ as before. Let Wj denote the support of wn(j). For
a symmetric matrix A, λmin signifies its smallest eigenvalue.
Condition S.2. There exist positive constants c1, c2, δ, and ζ(K), K ∈ N such that the following
holds:
(i) pi ∈ C;
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(ii) For each k ∈ KR, var(gk|w = (w1, ..., wJ)′) ≥ s2(F1, ..., FJ) and E[(gk/s(F1, ..., FJ))4|w =
(w1, ..., wJ)
′] < c1 hold for every (w1, ..., wJ) ∈ W1 × · · ·WJ ;
(iii) supw∈Wj |pi|j(w) − qK(w)′β
(j)
K | ≤ c1K−δ holds with some K-vector β(j)K for every K ∈ N,
1 ≤ i ≤ Ij , 1 ≤ j ≤ J ;
(iv) Letting q˜K := CK,jq
K , λminE[q˜
K(wn(j))q˜
K(wn(j))
′] ≥ c2 holds for every K and j, where
CK,j ,K ∈ N, 1 ≤ j ≤ J are constant nonsingular matrices;
(v) maxj supw∈Wj ‖q˜K(w)‖ ≤ c2ζ(K) for every K ∈ N.

Condition S.2(ii) is a version of Condition S.1 that accommodates the conditioning by w and series
estimation. Conditions S.2(iii)-(v) are standard regularity commonly used in the series regression
literature: (iii) imposes a uniform approximation error bound, (iv) avoids singular design (note the
existence of the matrices CK,j suffices) and (v) controls the lengths of the series terms used.
The next condition imposes restrictions on tuning parameters.
Condition S.3. τN and K(j), j = 1, ..., J satisfy
√
NjK
−δ(j) ↓ 0, ζ(K(j))2K(j)/Nj ↓ 0, j = 1, ..., J ,
τN ↓ 0, and √nτN ↑ ∞.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. We begin by introducing some notation.
Notation. Let bk,i, k = 1, ...,m, i = 1, ..., I denote the (k, i) element of B, then define
bk(j) = [bk,N1+···Nj−1+1, bk,N1+···Nj−1+2, ..., bk,N1+···Nj ]
′
for 1 ≤ j ≤ J and 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Let B(j) := [b1(j), ..., bm(j)]′ ∈ Rm×Ij . For F ∈ F and 1 ≤ j ≤ J ,
define
p
(j)
F (w) := EF [dj,n(j)|wn(j) = w], pi(j)F = p(j)F (wj), piF = [pi(1)F
′
, ..., pi
(J)
F
′
]′
and
Σ
(j)
F (w) := CovF [dj,n(j)|wn(j) = w].
Note that Σ
(j)
F (w) = diag
(
p
(j)
F (w)
)
− p(j)F (w)p(j)F (w)′.
The proof mimics the proof of Theorem 4.2, except for the treatment of pˆi. Instead of the
sequence piN , N = 1, 2, ... in P ∩ C, consider a sequence of distributions FN = [F1N , ..., FJN ], N =
1, 2, ... in F such that √Nj/K(j)B(j)pi(j)FN → hj , hj ≤ 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ J as N → ∞. Define Q(j)FN =
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EFN [q
K(j)(wn(j))q
K(j)(wn(j))
′] and Ξ(j)FN = EFN [B
(j)Σ
(j)
FN
(wn(j))B
(j)′ ⊗ qK(j)(wn(j))qK(j)(wn(j))′], and
let
V
(j)
FN
:= [Im ⊗ qK(j)(wj)′Q(j)FN
−1
]Ξ
(j)
FN
[Im ⊗Q(j)FN
−1
qK(j)(wj)]
and
VFN :=
J∑
j=1
V
(j)
FN
.
Then by adapting the proof of Theorem 2 in Newey (1997) to the triangle array for the repeated
crosssection setting, we obtain
√
NVFN
− 1
2B[pˆi − piFN ]
FN
; N(0, Im).
The rest is the same as the proof of Theorem 4.2. 
Next we turn to the definition of our endogeneity corrected estimator piEC propose a bootstrap
algorithm for it, and show its validity. Exogeneity of budget sets is a standard assumption in classical
demand analysis based on random utility models; for example, it is assumed, at least implicitly, in
McFadden and Richter (1991). Nonetheless, the assumption can be a concern in applying our testing
procedure to a data set such as ours. Recall that the budget sets {Bj}Jj=1 are based on prices and total
expenditure. The latter is likely to be endogenous, which should be a concern to the econometrician.
As independence between utility and budgets is fundamental to McFadden-Richter theory,
addressing it in our testing procedure might seem difficult. Fortunately, recent advances in nonpara-
metric identification and estimation of models with endogeneity inform a solution. To see this, it
is useful to rewrite the model so that we can cast it into a framework of nonseparable models with
endogenous covariates. Writing pj = p˜j/W , where p˜j is the unnormalized price vector, the essence
of the problem is as follows: Stochastic rationalizability imposes restrictions on the distributions of
y = D(p, u) for different p when u is distributed according to its population marginal distribution
Pu, but the observed conditional distribution of y given p does not estimate this when w and u are
interrelated. In particular, if we define JEC = minν∈Rh+ [piEC − Aν]
′Ω[piEC − Aν], with the definition
of piEC provided in Section 5, then JEC = 0 iff stochastic rationalizability holds. Note that the new
definition piEC recovers the previous definition of pi when w is exogenous.
Our estimator uses the control function approach. For example, given a reduced form w =
hj(z, ε) with hj monotone in ε and z is an instrument, one may use
(S.8) ε = F
(j)
w|z(w|z)
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where F
(j)
w|z denotes the conditional CDF of w given z under P
(j) when the random vector (w, z) obeys
the probability law P (j); see Imbens and Newey (2009) for this type of control variable in the context
of cross-sectional data. Note that ε ∼ Uni(0, 1) under every P (j), 1 ≤ j ≤ J by construction. Let
P
(j)
y|w,ε denote the conditional probability measure for y given (w, ε) corresponding to P
(j). Adapting
the argument in Imbens and Newey (2009) and Blundell and Powell (2003), under the assumption
that supp(w) = supp(w|ε) under P (j), 1 ≤ j ≤ J we have
pi(pj , xi|j) =
∫ 1
0
∫
u
1{Dj(wj , u) ∈ xi|j}dP (j)u|εdε
=
∫ 1
0
P
(j)
y|w,ε
{
y ∈ xi|j |w = wj , ε
}
dε, 1 ≤ j ≤ J.
This means that piEC can be estimated nonparametrically.
To estimate piEC, we can proceed in two steps as follows. The first step is to obtain control
variable estimates ̂n(j), n(j) = 1, ..., Nj for each j. For example, let F̂
(j)
w|z be a nonparametric estimator
for Fw|z for a given instrumental variable z in period j. For concreteness, we consider a series estimator
as in Imbens and Newey (2002). Let rL(z) = (r1L(z), ..., rLL(z)), where r`L(z), ` = 1, ..., L are basis
functions, then define
F̂
(j)
w|z(w|z) = rL(z)′R̂−(j)
Nj∑
n(j)=1
rL(j)(zn(j))1{wn(j) ≤ w}/Nj
where
R̂(j) =
Nj∑
n(j)=1
rL(j)(zn(j))r
L(j)(zn(j))
′/Nj .
Let
˜n(j) = F̂
(j)
w|z(wn(j)|zn(j)), n(j) = 1, ..., Nj .
Choose a sequence υN → 0, υN > 0 and define ιN (ε) = (ε+ υN )2/4υN , then let
γN (ε) =

1 if ε > 1 + υN
1− ιN (1− ε) if 1− υN < ε ≤ 1 + υN
ε if υN ≤ ε ≤ 1− υN
ιN (ε) if − υN ≤ ε ≤ υN
0 if ε < −υN
then our control variable is ε̂n(j) = γN (ε˜n(j)), n(j) = 1, ..., Nj .
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The second step is nonparametric estimation of P
(j)
y|w,ε
{
y ∈ xi|j |w = wj , ε
}
. Let χ̂n(j) = (wn(j), ε̂n(j))
′,
n(j) = 1, ..., Nj for each j. Write s
M(j)(χ) = (s1M(j)(χ), ..., sM(j)M(j)(χ))
′, where smM(j)(χ), χ ∈
RK+1,m = 1, ...,M(j) are basis functions, then our estimator for P
(j)
y|w,ε
{
y ∈ xi|j |w = ·, ε = ·
}
evalu-
ated at χ = (w, ε) is
P̂
(j)
y|w,ε
{
y ∈ xi|j |w, ε
}
= sM(j)(χ)′Ŝ−(j)
Nj∑
n(j)=1
sM(j)(χ̂n(j))di|j,n(j)/Nj
= sM(j)(χ)′α̂M(j)i
where
Ŝ(j) =
Nj∑
n(j)=1
sM(j)(χ̂n(j))s
M(j)(χ̂n(j))
′/Nj , α̂
M(j)
i := Ŝ
−(j)
Nj∑
n(j)=1
sM(j)(χ̂n(j))di|j,n(j)/Nj .
Our endogeneity corrected conditional probability pi(pj , xi|j) is a linear functional of P
(j)
y|w,ε
{
y ∈ xi|j |w = wj , ε
}
,
thus plugging in P̂
(j)
y|w,ε
{
y ∈ xi|j |w = wj , ε
}
into the functional, we define
̂pi(pj , xi|j) :=
∫ 1
0
P̂
(j)
y|w,ε
{
y ∈ xi|j |w = wj , ε
}
dε
= D(j)′α̂M(j)i ,
where D(j) :=
∫ 1
0
sM(j)
wj
ε
 dε i = 1, ..., Ij , j = 1, ..., J
and
piEC = [ ̂pi(p1, x1|1), ..., ̂pi(p1, xI1|1), ̂pi(p2, x1|2), ..., ̂pi(p2, xI2|2), ..., ̂pi(pJ , x1|J), ..., ̂pi(pJ , xIJ |J)]
′.
The final form of the test statistic is
JECN = N min
ν∈Rh+
[piEC −Aν]′Λ[piEC −Aν].
The calculation of critical values can be carried out in the same way as the testing procedure with
the series estimator pˆi for the exogenous case, though the covariance matrix v
(j)
N needs modification.
With the nonparametric endogeneity correction, the modified version of v
(j)
N is
v¯
(j)
N = [IIj ⊗D(j)′SN (j)−1]Λ¯(j)N [IIj ⊗ SN (j)−1D(j)]
where
SN (j) = E[s
M(j)(χn(j))s
M(j)(χn(j))
′
], Λ¯
(j)
N = Λ¯
(j)
1N
+ Λ¯
(j)
2N
,
Λ¯
(j)
1N
= E[Σ¯(j)(χn(j))⊗ sM(j)(χn(j))sM(j)(χn(j))′], Λ¯(j)2N = E[mn(j)m′n(j)]
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with
Σ¯(j)(χ) := Cov[dj,n(j)|χn(j) = χ],
mn(j) := [m
′
1,n(j),m
′
2,n(j), · · · ,m′Ij ,n(j)]′,
mi,n(j) :=
E
[
γ˙N (εm(j))
∂
∂ε
P
(j)
y|w,ε
{
y ∈ xi|j |wm(j), εm(j)
}
sM(j)(χm(j))r
L(j)(zm(j))
′RN (j)−1rL(j)(zn(j))umn(j)
]
∣∣∣∣di|j,n(j), wn(j), zn(j) ] ,
RN (j) := E[r
L(j)(zn(j))r
L(j)(zn(j))
′], umn(j) := 1{wn(j) ≤ wm(j)} − F (j)w|z(wm(j)|zn(j)).
Define
nEC = min
j
NjIj/trace(v¯
(j)
N ),
then a possible choice for τN is τN =
√
lognEC
nEC
. Proceed as for J˜N earlier in this section, replacing
vˆ
(j)
N with a consistent estimator for v¯
(j)
N for j = 1, ..., J , to define the bootstrap version J˜EC.
We impose some conditions to show the validity of the endogeneity-corrected test. Let εn(j) be
the value of the control variable ε for the n(j)-th consumer facing budget j. Noting {{di|j,n(j)}Iji=1, wn(j), εn(j)}Njn(j)=1
are IID-distributed within each time period j, 1 ≤ j ≤ J , let (dj , wj , εj) denote the choice-log
expenditure-control variable triplet of a consumer facing budget j. Let d = [d′1, ..., d′J ]
′, w =
[w1, ..., wJ ]
′, e = [ε1, ..., εJ ]′ and define g = Bd = [g1, ..., gm]′ as before. Let Xj = supp(χn(j)),
Zj = supp(zn(j)), and Ej = supp(εn(j)), 1 ≤ j ≤ J . Following the above discussion, define an
RI -valued functional
pi(P
(1)
y|w,ε, ..., P
(J)
y|w,ε) = [pi1|1(P
(1)
y|w,ε), ..., piI1|1(P
(1)
y|w,ε), pi1|2(P
(2)
y|w,ε), ..., piI2|2(P
(2)
y|w,ε), ..., pi1|J(P
(J)
y|w,ε), ..., piIJ |J(P
(J)
y|w,ε)]
′
where
pii|j(P
(j)
y|w,ε) :=
∫ 1
0
P
(j)
y|w,ε
{
y ∈ xi|j |w = wj , ε
}
dε
and εn(j) := F
(j)
w|z(wn(j)|zn(j)) for every j.
Condition S.4. There exist positive constants c1, c2, δ1, δ, ζr(L), ζs(M), and ζ1(M), L ∈ N, M ∈ N
such that the following holds:
(i) The distribution of wn(j) conditional on zn(j) = z is continuous for every z ∈ Zj, 1 ≤ j ≤ J ;
(ii) supp(wn(j)|εn(j) = ε) = supp(wn(j)) for every ε ∈ [0, 1], 1 ≤ j ≤ J ;
(iii) pi(P
(1)
y|w,ε, ..., P
(J)
y|w,ε) ∈ C;
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(iv) For each k ∈ KR, var(gk|w = (w1, ..., wJ)′, e = (ε1, ..., εJ))′ ≥ s2(F1, ..., FJ) and E[(gk/s(F1, ..., FJ))4
|w = (w1, ..., wJ)′, e = (ε1, ..., εJ)′] < c1 hold for every (w1, ..., wJ , ε1, ..., εJ) ∈ W1 × · · ·WJ ×
E1 × · · · EJ ;
(v) Letting r˜L := CL,jr
L, λminE[r˜
L(zn(j))r˜
L(zn(j))] ≥ c2 holds for every L and j, where CL,j , L ∈
N, 1 ≤ j ≤ J , are constant nonsingular matrices;
(vi) maxj supz∈Zj ‖r˜L(z)‖ ≤ c1ζr(L) for every L ∈ N.
(vii) supw∈Wj ,z∈Zj |F
(j)
w|z(w, z)−rL(z)′α
(j)
L (w)| ≤ c1L−δ1 , 1 ≤ j ≤ J holds with some L-vector α(j)L (·)
for every L ∈ N, 1 ≤ j ≤ J ;
(viii) Letting s˜M := C¯M,js
M , λminE[s˜
M (χn(j))s˜
M (χn(j))] ≥ c2 holds for every M and j, where
C¯M,j ,M ∈ N, 1 ≤ j ≤ J , are constant nonsingular matrices;
(ix) maxj supχ∈Xj ‖s˜M (χ)‖ ≤ Cζs(M) and maxj supχ∈Xj ‖∂s˜M (χ)/∂ε‖ ≤ c1ζ1(M) and ζs(M) ≤
Cζ1(M) for every M ∈ N;
(x) supχ∈Xj
∣∣∣P (j)y|w,ε{y ∈ xi|j |w, ε} − sM (χ)′g(i,j)M ∣∣∣ ≤ c1M−δ, holds with some M -vector g(i,j)M for
every M ∈ N, 1 ≤ i ≤ Ij , 1 ≤ j ≤ J ;
(xi) P
(j)
y|w,ε{y ∈ xi|j |w, ε}, 1 ≤ i ≤ Ij , 1 ≤ j ≤ J , are twice continuously differentiable in χ = (w, ε).
Moreover, max1≤j≤J max1≤i≤Ij supχ∈χj
∥∥∥ ∂∂χP (j)y|w,ε {y ∈ xi|j |w, ε}∥∥∥ ≤ c1 and
max1≤j≤J max1≤i≤Ij supχ∈χj
∥∥∥ ∂2∂χ∂χ′P (j)y|w,ε {y ∈ xi|j |w, ε}∥∥∥ ≤ c1.

Since we use the control function approach to deal with potential endogeneity in w (income), Con-
ditions S.4(i)-(ii) are essential. See Blundell and Powell (2003) and Imbens and Newey (2009) for
further discussion on these types of restrictions. Just like Condition S.2(ii), Condition S.4(iv) is a
version of Condition S.1 that accommodates the two-step series estimation. Conditions S.4(iv)-(xi)
corresponds to standard regularity conditions stated in the context of the two-step approach adopted
in this section: (iv) and (x) imposes uniform approximation error bounds, (v) and (viii) avoid singu-
lar designs (note the existence of the matrices CL,j and C¯M,j suffices), and (vi) and (ix) control the
lengths of (the derivatives of) the series terms used. Condition S.4(xi) imposes reasonable smoothness
restrictions on the (observable) conditional probabilities P
(j)
y|w,ε{y ∈ xi|j |w, ε}, 1 ≤ i ≤ Ij , 1 ≤ j ≤ J .
The next condition impose restrictions on tuning parameters.
Condition S.5. Let τN , M(j) and L(j), j = 1, ..., J satisfy τN ↓ 0, √nECτN ↑ ∞, NjL(j)1−2δ1 ↓ 0,
NjM(j)
−2δ ↓ 0, M(j)ζ1(M(j))2L2(j)/Nj ↓ 0, ζs(M(j))6L4(j)/Nj ↓ 0, and ζ1(M(j))4ζr(L(j))4/Nj ↓ 0
and also C(L(j)/Nj + L(j)
1−2δ1) ≤ υ3N ≤ C(L(j)/Nj + L(j)1−2δ1), for some 0 < C < C.
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Proof of Theorem 5.2. The proof follows the same steps as those in the proof of Theorem 4.2,
except for the treatment of the estimator for pi. Therefore, instead of the sequence piN , N = 1, 2, ...
in P ∩ C, consider a sequence of distributions FN = [F1N , ..., FJN ], N = 1, 2, ... in FEC and the
corresponding conditional distributions P
(j)
y|w,ε;FN {y ∈ xi|j |w, ε} and F
(j)
w|zN , 1 ≤ i ≤ Ij , 1 ≤ j ≤ J ,
N = 1, 2, ... such that
√
Nj/(M(j) ∨ L(j)))B(j)pi(j)FN → hj , hj ≤ 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ J as N → ∞, where
piFN = pi(P
(1)
y|w,εN , ..., P
(J)
y|w,εN ) whereas the definitions of V
(j)
FN
, 1 ≤ j ≤ J are given shortly. Define
S
(j)
FN
= EFN [s
M(j)(χn(j))s
M(j)(χn(j))
′] as well as
Ξ¯
(j)
1FN
= EFN [B
(j)Σ¯
(j)
FN
(χn(j))B
(j)′ ⊗ sM(j)(χn(j))sM(j)(χn(j))′]
and
Ξ¯
(j)
2FN
= [B(j) ⊗ IM(j)]EFN [mn(j);FNm′n(j);FN ][B(j)
′ ⊗ IM(j)]
where
Σ
(j)
FN
(χ) := CovFN [dj,n(j)|χn(j) = χ],
mn(j);FN := [m
′
1,n(j);FN
,m′2,n(j);FN , · · · ,m′Ij ,n(j);FN ]′,
mi,n(j);FN :=
EFN
[
γ˙N (εm(j))
∂
∂ε
P
(j)
y|w,ε;FN
{
y ∈ xi|j |wm(j), εm(j)
}
sM(j)(χm(j))r
L(j)(zm(j))
′RFN (j)
−1rL(j)(zn(j))umn(j);FN
]
∣∣∣∣di|j,n(j), wn(j), zn(j) ] ,
RFN (j) := EFN [r
L(j)(zn(j))r
L(j)(zn(j))
′], umn(j);FN := 1{wn(j) ≤ wm(j)} − F (j)w|zN (wm(j)|zn(j)).
With these definitions, let
V
(j)
FN
:=
[
Im ⊗D(j)′S(j)FN
−1]
Ξ¯
(j)
FN
[
Im ⊗ S(j)FN
−1
D(j)
]
with Ξ¯
(j)
FN
= Ξ¯
(j)
1FN
+ Ξ¯
(j)
2FN
. Define
V FN :=
J∑
j=1
V
(j)
FN
.
Then by adapting the proof of Theorem 7 in Imbens and Newey (2002) to the triangular array for the
repeated cross-section setting, for the j’s that satisfy Condition (iv) we obtain
√
NV FN
− 1
2B[pˆi − piFN ]
FN
; N(0, Im).
The rest is the same as the proof of Theorem 4.2. 
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Appendix B: Algorithms for Computing A
This appendix details algorithms for computation of A. The first algorithm is the depth-first
search that we in fact implemented. The second algorithm is a further refinement using Theorem 3.2.
Algorithms use notation introduced in the proof of Theorem 3.2.
Computing A as in Theorem 3.1.
1. Initialize m1 = ... = mJ = 1.
2. Initialize l = 2.
3. Set c(B1) = xm1|1, . . . , c(Bl) = xml|l. Check for revealed preference cycles.
4. If a cycle is detected, move to step 7. Else:
5. If l < J, set l = l + 1, ml = 1, and return to step 3. Else:
6. Extend A by the column [m1, ...,mJ ]
′.
7a. If ml < Il, set ml = ml + 1 and return to step 3.
7b. If ml = Il and ml−1 < Il−1, set ml = 1, ml−1 = ml−1 + 1, l = l − 1, and return
to step 3.
7c. If ml = Il, ml−1 = Il−1, and ml−2 < Il−2, set ml = ml−1 = 1, ml−2 = ml−2 + 1,
l = l − 2, and return to step 3.
(...)
7z. Terminate.
Refinement using Theorem 3.2
Let budgets be arranged s.t. (B1, ...,BM ) do not intersect BJ ; for exposition of the algorithm,
assume BJ is above these budgets.
1. Use preceding algorithm to compute a matrix AM+1→J−1 corresponding to budgets
(BM+1, ...,BJ), though using the full X corresponding to budgets (B1, ...,BJ).21
2. For each column aM+1→J−1 of AM+1→J−1, go through the following steps:
2.1 Compute (using preceding algorithm) all vectors a1→M s.t.(a1→M , aM+1→J−1) is
rationalizable.
2.2 Compute (using preceding algorithm) all vectors aJ s.t.(aM+1→J−1, aJ)
is rationalizable.
2.3 All stacked vectors (a′1→M , a
′
M+1→J−1, a
′
J)
′ are valid columns of A.
21This matrix has more rows than an A matrix that is only intended to apply to choice problems (BM+1, ...,BJ).
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Appendix C: Justification of Table 1
This appendix derives the upper bound on nodes visited by a tree search as described in Section
3.4.2. We only count nodes corresponding to j ≥ 2 as rationalizability of implied choice behavior is
checked only at those.
Consider the number of nodes visited in generation j+1, i.e. corresponding to budget Bj . Since
Ij ≤ 2J−1, this is at most 2J−1 times the number of nodes in the j’th generation at which no choice
cycle was detected. These nodes, in turn, correspond to the at most H¯j−1 direct revealed preference
orderings that can occur on (j − 1) budgets. However, since we look at patches corresponding to the
entire set of J budgets, each of those orderings has multiple representations. Specifically, each patch
in an A-matrix corresponding to the first (j − 1) budgets corresponds to at most 2J−(j−1) patches
in the problem under consideration (because the patches are generated by intersecting the original
patch with (J − (j − 1)) budgets). These refined patches can be arbitrarily combined across the first
(j − 1) budgets, so that each direct revealed preference ordering on the first (j − 1) budgets has at
most 2(J−j+1)(j−1) representations. Thus, the number of nodes visited in generation j + 1, j, ..., J , is
at most H¯j−12(J−j+1)(j−1)+J−1 = H¯j−12j(J+2−j)−2. This bound must be summed over j = 2, ..., J .
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